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ABSTRACT
STALNAKER AND FIELD ON TRUTH AND INTENTIONALITY
SEPTEMBER 1990
CAROL R. GABRIEL, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
In a series of publications, Robert Stalnaker and
Hartry Field have undertaken a dispute about what is the
correct way to explain intentionality naturalistically
.
Field wishes to assimilate mental intentionality to
linguistic intentionality and to explain both kinds of
intentionality using Tarskian truth theory plus the causal
theory of reference. Stalnaker wishes to subsume mental
intentionality under the notion of indication and to explain
it on the model of measurement theory, leaving linguistic
intentionality to be explained derivatively. I attempt to
adjudicate their dispute, paying particular attention to the
question whether Tarskian truth theory has a role to play in
explaining intentionality naturalistically.
The first half of the dissertation examines Tarski's
theory. I argue that Field and Stalnaker are incorrect when
they agree that Tarski's reduction of the notion of truth is
defective and I explain Tarski's 'structural' notion of
truth. In the second half of the dissertation, I argue that
v
Stalnaker s criticisms of Field mostly do not stand up to
scrutiny, but that Field's theory is unsatisfactory
nonetheless; I also argue that certain criticisms of
Stalnaker do more damage than he thinks. I conclude that
neither has solved 'the problem of intentionality
' , but that
Stalnaker is right that truth theory as such will not have a
role in the correct solution.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the early nineteen-seventies, Stalnaker (following
Lewis) said that belief was a functional state, and Field
said that a materialistically adequate reduction of the
notion of truth would not consist only in a Tarskian truth
characterization
,
as Tarski supposed, but would also contain
a physicalistic theory of denotation such as the causal
theory. From these two apparently unrelated points,
Stalnaker and Field were set on a collision course. The two
claims had these things in common: they were each at least
in part about an intentional phenomenon (belief on the one
hand and meaning, broadly construed, on the other) and each
author was interested in providing a naturalistic account of
his phenomenon. Each author also thought he could
generalize his view. Field made the first move toward
generalization: in a paper called 'Mental Representation'
[1978], he argued that mental representation was to be
understood on the model of linguistic representation and
hypothesized a language of thought. Linguistic
representation was construed in terms of physicalistic
denotation plus a Tarskian truth characterization. He
proposed an account of one mental intentional relation -
belief- using this model. He also attacked the
2functionalists' approach to belief, arguing that it did not
give an account of intentionality
. In the first two
chapters of his book Inquiry
, Stalnaker took up the
challenge, attacking Field's theory and proposing a
model for understanding intentionality
naturalistically — the measurement model. He gave, in turn,
his own account of belief, one adhering to this model and
one according to which belief is a functional state. He
also said that Tarskian truth theory has no role to play in
explaining intentionality as such and proposed a peripheral
role for it. Then it was Field's turn again: in a symposium
on Stalnaker 's book, he attacked Stalnaker 's account of
belief specifically and argued that his own approach to
intentionality was in general preferable to Stalnaker 's.
Stalnaker again replied. (See Stalnaker [1976a], [1984],
[1986], and Field, [1972], [1978], [1981], 1986b].)
My aim in this dissertation is to evaluate this
dispute, keeping a particularly attentive eye on the
question whether Tarskian truth theory has a role to play in
explaining intentionality. In the present chapter, I
introduce the issues. In Chapters Two and Three, I present
Tarski's theory of truth, criticisms by Field and others,
and I reply to the criticisms; I argue that Field was wrong
in thinking that Tarski's reduction was inadequate, and I
explain Tarski's 'structural' concept of truth. In Chapter
Four, I present Field's theory of representation and
Stalnaker 's criticisms of it, arguing that Stalnaker 's
3criticisms mostly miss their mark, but that Field's view is
nonetheless defective. In Chapter Five, I present
Stalnaker s view, Field's criticisms, and some replies from
Stalnaker, arguing that certain criticisms do more damage
than Stalnaker thinks and that his view has other problems
as well. I conclude that neither has solved "the problem of
intentionality
" , but that Stalnaker is right that truth
theory as such will not have a role in the correct answer.
Field's and Stalnaker 's Theories
According to Field, a "materialistically adequate
account" of intentional relations must show them not to be
" irreducibly mental" relations. (Cf. [1978], p.78.) He
thinks he can produce such an account for belief and desire.
It is only belief that he discusses in any detail. The
central strategy is to conceive of belief and desire as
"attitudes toward meaningful sentences in a system of
internal representation" ([1978], p.98). Roughly, the idea
is to break the belief relation into two parts, belief* and
meaning. Belief* is a relation that holds between a person
and a sentence of an internal language. Schematically put,
X believes that P iff for some sentence S of X's system of
internal representation, X believes* S and S means that P.
This proposal will only be materialistically adequate
if 'S means that P' can be given a materialistically
4adequate explication, and here is where Tarski comes in.
Meaning is explicated in terms of truth conditions. Field
gives two theories, one for the friends of propositions, the
other for the enemies of propositions. A proposition is
construed as a set of worlds, and a sentence thus means the
set of worlds at which it is true. The concept of a
sentence being true at a world needs to be defined, and the
main ingredient of the definition is a Tarskian truth-
characterization. Other ingredients are the notions of
names denoting objects, predicates standing for properties,
and actuality. For Field, materialistic adequacy requires
that there be no mysterious relations to other worlds, and
thus the base clause of a truth characterization must be
given using the notions of denotation in the actual world
and standing for in the actual world, as follows:
'P(b)' is true at w iff there is an object x that
b denotes (in the actual world) and a property Z
that P stands for (in the actual world), and w is
a world in which x exists and has Z ([1978, p.86).
Field's own preference is to do away with propositions,
and he renders the second version of the proposal in the
following words. (This quotation comes from a section of
[1978] that occurs after Field has gotten tired of his
asterisk and started using 'believe* instead of
'believe* ' . ) :
...let us say that a person 'believes that £'
(where 'p' abbreviates an English sentence S) if
that person believes some sentence in his system
of internal representation whose translation
into English is S. ([1978], p.97)
5In a shift familiar from the work of Quine, the notion of
translation takes over the work of the notion of meaning.
Field says that the notion of translation involved is to be
loose and sloppy' and 'indeterminate' ([1978], p.97).
Over all, the strategy is to use the concepts of
language and meaning as a paradigm to explicate the
intentional relations, belief and desire. A relation such
as belief* which holds between a person and a token is
deemed not to be problematic from a materialist point of
view. The concept of meaning is then analyzed further or
done away with in favor of the notion of translation. Field
does not comment on intentional relations other than belief
and desire (and meaning), but presumably he thinks this
method would work for other propositional attitudes as well.
Stalnaker announces that he is looking for a
'naturalistic explanation' of intentionality . Inquiry is
mostly concerned with the intentionality of certain mental
states rather than with linguistic intentionality.
Stalnaker characterizes his project as follows:
I am mainly concerned with one specific kind of
fact about belief and other mental states, the
fact... that such states stand in intentional or
representational relations. What I want to explain
in naturalistic terms is the nature of such
relations. ([1986], p.114)
On Stalnaker 's view, mental intentionality is prior to
linguistic intentionality and is explained differently. For
the purpose of explaining certain mental relations (one of
which is belief), Stalnaker introduces the measurement
model. He thinks that the relation between, say, a person
6and the number that indicates his weight is straightforward
and unmysterious, and he seeks a similar account to take the
mystery out of relations between persons and the rather
abstract items we know as propositions. He seeks an account
that will associate a range of possible properties of
persons
, e.g. beliefs, with a range of propositions much in
the way that measurement theory associates a range of
possible properties of persons, e.g. weights, with a range
of numbers.
In the case of belief, it is the theory of Dretske and
Stampe that will do this: Stalnaker sees representation as a
kind of indication. Following them, he defines a
representational system as "a system that is capable of
being in a range of alternative states that tend to
correlate with and be caused by, a corresponding set of
alternative states of the world" ([1986], p.116). (Schiffer
(in [1986]) calls this the 'fuel gauge model' of
representation. ) Tree rings and weather cycles provide an
example of a representational system? so does mental
representation. The explanatory force of this conception
does not come from truth conditional correlation, but still
from a correlation, of a different kind.
For Stalnaker, mental intentionality is independent of
linguistic intentionality and prior to it. His conception of
linguistic intentionality is based on some ideas of Lewis,
which ultimately derive from Grice [1957]. He sketches its
broad outlines as follows:
7One might begin an explanation of the semantic
relation between a sentence S and a proposition
x by explaining what it is for a speaker to mean
x by uttering S. Then one might go on to explain
what it is for a sentence S to mean x in terms of
the existence of a convention in a population of
speakers that S should be used to mean x. Con-
ventions are to be explained in terms of the
Patterns of beliefs and intentions of the mem-
bers of the population. ([1984], p.32)
He endorses a version of Lewis's idea that the convention is
one of 'truthfulness and trust'. (Cf. [Lewis, 1975].)
In rejecting Field's theory, Stalnaker makes a special
point of rejecting the idea that a Tarskian truth
characterization has any role to play in explaining
intentionality naturalistically . He conceives the issues
like this. One is asking for a solution to 'the problem of
intentionality' for external language when one asks 'What
physical (or sociological or psychological) facts constitute
the fact that sentence S expresses the proposition x ?' (cf.
[1984], p.32). A further and different question is how S
and x came to stand in that relation, whatever it turns out
to be . A Tarskian truth characterization contributes to the
correct answer to the second question, but not the first.
So, there is a question about intentionality to which
Tarskian truth theory can make a contribution, according to
Stalnaker, but it is a question about linguistic
intentionality only and not one that has any direct bearing
on 'the problem of intentionality'. The question is, how
did those sentences and those propositions come to stand in
the relation means that ? Well, a convention was
established and persisted. The continuing presence of a
8convention is explained by appeal to the concepts of
precedent and imitation. And, says Stalnaker,
[t]o explain the rich and flexible set of
conventions which constitute the fact that apopulation speaks and understands a language, one
must find a small finite number of basic
conventions which it is plausible to believe
could be sustained by precedent, imitation, and
explicit teaching, but which together have a large,possible infinite set of deductive consequences
the form S is used to mean x" . This, of course,
is just what a compositional semantic theory such
as a Tarskian truth characterization provides.
([1984]. p . 33
)
Sorting Out Some Issues
Three concepts of interest to our authors are mental
states, intensionality, and intentionality. The terms
'mental state', 'intentionality', and 'intensionality' are
all quas i-technical and are used in different ways by
different authors. There is thus no question of trying to
give 'the' definition or analysis of these concepts. It
would be nice to be able just to list stipulative
definitions or criteria for these concepts given by the
various authors, but these are missing. There is an issue
one could take to be philosophical not very far below the
surface: the problem of how to classify the various
phenomena known as mental, intensional and intentional, in a
way that is useful and takes account of the affinities
between them. What I propose to do here is present a simple
and relatively primitive classification of the phenomena so
9as to get a handle on them. The three concepts converge in
sentences of the form that so interests our authors, 'X
believes that p'. This simple classification scheme will
show to what extent they diverge elsewhere.
Mental States
For present purposes, we will assume that all mental
states have subjects. Let's say that a concept C is mental
if C is instantiated, then it follows that some
thinker (s) and thought (s) exist, and it does not follow that
any contingent thing exists other than thinkers and
thoughts. ( 'Thought' here is intended broadly, so that it
covers events, states and processes of thought. Obviously
it does not mean 'object of thought'.) A concept C is
quasi-mental iff, if C is instantiated, then it follows that
some thinkers and thoughts exist and also that some
contingent thing other than thinkers and thoughts exists.
Let's call mental and quasi-mental concepts ' mentalistic '
.
A concept C is non-mentalistic iff, if C is instantiated,
the existence of thinkers and thoughts is not entailed.
(These biconditionals are meant as classificational , not
criterial. As criteria, they would be circular. Also, I
ignore the problem of the various kinds of compounds of
contingent objects and sets of contingent objects. The
biconditionals could be fixed up to accommodate them, if
10
necessary.) Examples of mental states: belief that, hope
that, desire that, intention that, expectation that, feeling
that, feeling happy, seeking. Examples of quasi-mental
states, seeing, voting (individual and group), attributing
to, intentionally stabbing, and, perhaps, an object's having
a purpose. Examples of non-mentalistic states: falling,
aging, weighing such-and-such. Some controversial states:
meaning, reference, representation, indication, aboutness.
Intensionality
Intensionality belongs to expressions of a language
rather than concepts. Two things standardly taken to
indicate the presence of intensionality are failure of
existential generalization ('failure of EG') and failure of
substitution. These tests apply to natural language and
their use produces useful but pr ima facie generalizations.
There are different kinds of substitution and
existential generalization. I will not discuss them all.
By 'substitution' I will here mean substitution of
coextensive names. By 'EG', I will here mean existential
generalization on a name. Definite descriptions, indefinite
descriptions, and coextensive predicates present special
problems of their own. ( Pre-analytically
,
it is rather
unclear what shall count as substitution and EG for natural
language. I rely on the standard examples.) I also assume
11
for present purposes that a name not in an intensional
context must refer in order for the sentence to be true.
Failure of substitution and failure of EG do not always
go together. Let's say an expression is strongly
intensional iff both fail (in its scope), weakly intensional
if one or the other but not both fails, intensional if one
or the other or both fails, and non-intensional if neither
fails. Let's also define a special concept, c-
intens ionality (after Chisholm, whose idea this is (see
[1967])): a sentence-embedding expression is c-intensional
iff the result of embedding any sentence in it is a
contingent sentence.
Both EG and substitution fail for 'believes that' (or
so it is thought). Only EG fails for 'is thinking about':
'Mary is thinking about The Scarlet Pimpernel' does not
entail 'Something exists such that Mary is thinking about
it'. In the presence of the sentence 'Poppy Bush is George
Bush', 'Mary is thinking about Poppy Bush' entails 'Mary is
thinking about George Bush'. Constructions involving
'about' in general seem to be more transparent than
counterparts involving 'that': compare 'has a belief about'
and 'thinks about' with 'believes that' and 'thinks that'.
If we use the adverb 'intentionally', we can produce
cases for which substitution and not EG fails. 'Mary
intentionally stabbed Mark Twain' does not in the presence
of 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' entail 'Mary intentionally
stabbed Samuel Clemens' . However, since one does not stab
12
what does not exist, it does entail 'There exists something
such that Mary intentionally stabbed it'. This claim
applies to sentences containing other adverbs as well, e.g.
'happily'. it is sometimes claimed that there are veridical
and non-veridical senses of 'remembers'; if there is a
veridical sense, then 'Mary remembers that Mark Twain lived
in Hartford', taken in the veridical sense, provides another
example of this type.
Finally, neither substitution nor EG fails for 'Mary
saw George’ and 'Mary saw George run'. These entail 'There
exists something Mary saw', and, in the presence of 'George
is Poppy' they entail respectively 'Mary saw Poppy' and
'Mary saw Poppy run 1
. (These observations are of course
derived from Barwise and Perry [1983].)
We should note that much more baroque and subtle
classifications could be constructed if we considered other
types of substitution and existential generalization. Also
we might keep in mind that inasmuch as all this is evidence
about logical form, it is prima facie evidence. On one
approach to the semantics of propositional attitude verbs,
all the above substitutions in fact go through, although
there are pragmatic difficulties about stating the
inferences. If this approach is correct, the above
distinctions collapse, and all we are left with is a
bipartite classification: those expressions for which EG
fails and those for which it does not. And if the logic of
English should turn out to be free, the bipartite
13
classification collapses, too, and we would need to start
afresh
.
Intentionality
Our third notion is intentionality. It has been said
that intentionality is present where there is aboutness, or
representation, or directedness to an object. Let's call
these expressions ( represents', 'is about', 'is directed
to') the 'primitives of intentionality'. Speaking pre-
analytically
,
there seem to be two main kinds of
intentionality: that of thought and that of (external)
language: species of aboutness, representation or
directedness are found in the semantic notions of meaning
and reference, and other species relate to the realm of
thought, e.g. thinking of or having an image of. Not all
mental life has an object: a vague feeling of happiness need
not be about anything. Not all the workings of language
involve aboutness, either. The imperative is coordinated
with a certain speech act, but is not about that speech act,
and perhaps not about anything. The syntactic operation
that yields such sentences of the predicate calculus as 'Fa'
is coordinated, in interpretation, with set membership, but
is not about set membership. (The expressions 'is a member
of' and 'e' are about set membership.)
14
Let's say that a concept is intentional iff necessarily
if it is instantiated, then some thing is about something
( something is intended to be schematic and not
existential). A concept is non-intentional iff it is not
intentional. It seems that intentional items can be
(partially) ordered in that some represent more and less
directly than others. Let's say that a representation a
more directly represents a thing x than b does iff (i) a and
b each represent x, (ii) necessarily if b represents x then
ci does, and (iii) it is not the case that necessarily if a
rePresen ^- s x then b does. As an example, consider Sam, who
believes that George is a spy and who, as part of so doing,
has a representation of George. His representation of
George more directly represents George than does his belief
about George.
This conception of intentionality is rather narrow.
Broader ones are available. For example, according to a
tradition originating in Aristotle, aboutness is a special
case of a broader relation sometimes called 'signification'
which has epistemic content. The trouble with these broader
conceptions in the present context is that they pronounce on
some of the questions which will be at issue. The
underlying problem with which Field and Stalnaker are
concerned is, how exactly do we generalize about meaning and
representation? Must we appeal to mentalistic concepts or
not?
15
Correlations
?
Our systems for classifying the phenomena are extremely
crude, but they will serve to set the scene. The following
claims are all false:
-Every mentalistic concept is expressed by an intensional
idiom.
-Every mental concept is expressed by an intensional idiom.
(Counterexample: 'Jones hurts'.)
—Intensional idioms express only mentalistic concepts.
-The presence of a propositional mental attitude can only be
reported in a strongly intensional idiom. (Counterexample:
'Mary attributes wisdom to John').
However, the following claims appear to be true, or at
least defensible:
-If an expression is weakly intensional by failure of
substitution, it expresses a mentalistic concept.
-Except possibly for the primitives of intentionality
,
if an
expression is weakly intensional by failure of existential
generalization, it expresses a mentalistic concept.
(Brentano thought it was a mark of mental states that they
could be directed on objects that did not exist.)
-The primitives of intentionality are all weakly intensional
by failure of existential generalization.
The following claim made by Chisholm ([1967]) is
questionable, although it may be able to be defended in the
end
:
16
-Every c-intensional expression expresses a mental concept.
Probability may seem to provide counterexamples; Chisholm
says various things about probability. Other possible
counterexamples involve related concepts, such as causation
and concepts involving specially limited accessibility
relations
.
It is also not clear whether the following claims are
true or false;
—Whenever there is intentionality, a mentalistic concept is
instantiated
.
-Necessarily, whenever there is intentionality
,
a
mentalistic concept is instantiated.
-Every concept such that if it is instantiated, then there
is intentionality, is also such that it can be analyzed in
terms of non-intentional concepts.
-Linguistic intentionality is more basic than mental
intentionality (or vice versa).
The controversial claims are the interesting ones. Is
it the case that when there is intentionality -aboutness-, a
mentalistic concept is instantiated ? Is it necessarily so?
There are three main ways to say yes to the first question:
(1) representation is always the result of purposive
activity, (2) representation is always representation for
someone, and (3) representation always involves coordination
of structure of representing items with represented items,
but of the many systems that might do this, one must be
chosen and used. Here is one way to say no to the first
17
question: all representation is ultimately linguistic, and
linguistic representation is truth-theoretic, which
conception does not involve minds. Here is another:
representation is just indication, which conception does not
involve minds.
Some Questions and Some Desiderata
What should we demand of a 'naturalistic' theory of
intentionality ? What do Field and Stalnaker demand?
Stalnaker and Field have slightly different aims, actually,
which leads to some misunderstanding. I am going to take
the high road here and simply list some questions their
theories can be taken to address instead of dissecting the
misunderstandings. (The issue, or an issue, does get joined
most of the time.) Later we will figure out whether the
theories address the questions successfully.
Stalnaker and Field have this much in common: they want
to show that intentional relations are amenable to empirical
study and not mysteriously outside the natural order. Both
focus on belief, and both produce claims about belief that
are designed to serve a dual purpose. Each author wishes
(a) to present his naturalistic account of belief and (b) to
give an example of his general approach, showing how it is
supposed to work and that, in the instance of belief, it
does work. Each produces an equivalence with 'S believes
18
that P on the lefthand side. But each has a slightly
different ambition concerning what shall appear on the other
side. Field's smaller goal is to have no mentalistic
notions appear, or at least to make it plausible that none
are required. His larger goal of course is to show how and
that his approach works in a specific instance. Stalnaker's
smaller goal is to produce a correct equivalence making
belief both a functional notion and a species of the notion
of indication, which notion, he thinks, applies to phenomena
that do not involve minds. His larger goal is to give an
example that makes convincing his claim that intentionality
can be explained on the model he proposes.
As we have seen, Stalnaker speaks of 'constitution' of
intentional facts, and of the 'nature' of representation.
Field speaks of giving an 'account'. Schiffer in his
commentary on Stalnaker ([1986]) speaks about reduction, and
Field uses that word also. However, both theories are so
sketchy that evaluating them as reductions of intentional to
physical notions would largely be an exercise in
speculation. We will take the minimalist approach.
Let us say that a material biconditional gives an
account of a propositional attitude (such as belief-that)
iff it is true and has the form
S [verb]s that p iff ....
and the sentence comprising the left side does not appear on
the right side. We also say that the condition reported on
19
the right in an account constitutes the state described on
the left. We also assume that by 'nature' Stalnaker means
either logical or physical nature: that the qualities in
question are either logically or physically necessary.
Here, then, are the main questions we will be keeping
in mind:
(1) Is there a mentalistic concept of which one can give an
account without using other mentalistic concepts?
(2) Is there a mentalistic intentional concept of which one
can give an account without using other intentional
concepts ?
(3) Is there a propositional mental concept of which one can
give an account without using intensional language?
We will also test assertions about 'the nature of
representation/intentionality
' by asking the following
question ( s )
:
(4) Given the qualities that are logically (physically)
necessary to representation, can one give an account of
belief in terms of those qualities?
Here are the desiderata against which I will measure
Stalnaker 's and Field's theories: (1) the usual: their
proposals must be coherent and ^over what they are supposed
to cover; for our purposes, they will be judged to have
covered 'what they are supposed to cover' if there is at
least one question above which gets a 'yes'. (2) there must
be some hope of showing belief continuous with other mental
20
concepts, and not just propositional ones, either; (3) the
treatment of belief must be consonant with what is known
about the semantics of 'believes' and ought not rule out
promising approaches; (4) the claim of a phy sicalistic
basis or analysis must be made plausible in some way and not
merely asserted; (5) the projected theory should be able to
decide at least some of the controversial cases and
questions we listed earlier ( -what's a theory for?).
21
CHAPTER II
TARSKI'S THEORY OF TRUTH
In his well-known paper ([1972]), Field takes Tarski to
task for not having given a physicalistically acceptable
definition of truth, despite claims to the contrary, and
suggests an additional component for the theory to remedy
its flaws. The resulting theory is the basis for Field's
theories of meaning and representation generally. In one of
their few points of agreement, Stalnaker accepts Field's
criticism of Tarski, and others have accepted it as well.
(Besides Stalnaker [1984], see Devitt [1984] and McDowell
[1980].) In this chapter and the next I defend Tarski
against Field and other critics.
I begin by presenting a simplified version of Tarski's
theory. I then present three classic criticisms of Tarski:
Field's, Putnam's and Davidson's. Next, I answer the
criticisms of Putnam and Davidson. I then present three
attempts to defend Tarski against Field and argue that they
do not succeed. In the next chapter, I present my own reply
to Field and further discussion of Tarski's theory.
22
Tarski 1 s Theory
Tarski was interested in the paradoxes that could be
generated intuitively using such semantical notions as
denotation, application, satisfaction, and truth. He
wondered whether a consistent deductive theory employing
these notions could be constructed. This was half of the
impetus that resulted in his famous theory. As a matter of
interest when constructing deductive theories, one tries to
use as few primitives as possible and tries to presuppose as
little as possible in the way of other theories. This was
the other half. Tarski was led to a startling discovery:
not only could a deductive theory containing the semantic
notions be given, the notions themselves could all be
defined in terms of just one of them, satisfaction, which
could in turn be defined using just the resources of logic
and set theory - in "purely logical" terms, as Tarski has
it. That is to say, the notions of semantics, including
truth, could be defined without using any specifically
semantic primitives at all. (Putnam suggests that this
should have been called the "Look No Semantics 1 Conception
of Truth". See [1985], p. 63). The only constraint that
emerges is that the metalanguage variables have to be of
higher order than the object language variables. In an
article where he summarizes his results informally, Tarski
renders his main conclusion as follows:
It is possible to construct in the metalanguage
methodologically correct and materially adequate
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de finitions of the semantical concepts if and onlyif the metalanguage is equipped with variables oflgher logical type than all the variables of thelanguage which is the subject of investigation.
([1956], p. 406)
It is the right-to-left half of the biconditional that makes
this statement so striking. Tarski says, further, that
...the semantical concepts are defined in terms ofthe usual concepts of the metalanguage and are thus
reduced to purely logical concepts, the concepts ofthe language being investigated and the specific
concepts of the morphology of language. In this way
semantics becomes a part of the morphology of lan-guage if the latter in understood in a sufficiently
wide sense. ([1956], p.406)
By 'morphology of language' Tarski means the study of the
structure of language, and he is asserting that semantics is
part of the study of the structure of language and that
truth (along with the other semantic concepts) is a matter
of structure. We are not yet in a position to understand
what this might mean, but the explication of this idea will
concern us again below.
Tarski's interests converged with those of the logical
positivists (with whom he was associated), who had been
entertaining their own suspicions of the notion of truth.
They were of course sensitive to the threat of incoherence
emanating from the paradoxes; moreover, 'true' seemed, to
the verificationist turn of mind, otiose. Once you had
verified 'Grass is green' (presumably by judicious sampling
and careful observation of color), you had verified '"Grass
is green" is true'; there was, it seemed, nothing left to
do. There was a certain amount of feeling that 'true' ought
to be expunged from a 'scientifically correct' vocabulary.
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Tarski was able to provide an example of a consistent
theory containing semantical notions and one which showed
that 'true' was in a certain special sense otiose. If you
have a language all of whose constants are physicalistically
acceptable, then introducing a metalanguage (for that
language) and defining metalinguistic truth need not add
anything beyond what is already given in logic and set
theory - not anything that should worry a physicalist. The
positivists were thus given the means to consign
semantical ism, the view that there are irreducibly semantic
facts, to the dustbin to which they consigned such anti-
physicalist doctrines as dualism and vitalism. Physicalism
held the day. (Cf. Field, [1972].)
Tarski's dodge for avoiding paradox was to maintain a
sharp distinction between object language and metalanguage
and to insist on different truth-predicates for different
languages. A truth-predicate is a syntactic part of the
metalanguage in which it appears and is localized to the
specific object language for which truth is being defined.
It is not possible to define one over-arching truth
predicate on Tarski's scheme of things, although it is
possible to make some general claims about truth predicates.
Tarski thus employs two different approaches to discussing
truth. The first is to give a specific truth definition
which is exemplar of his method. The second approach
involves speaking more generally, laying down requirements
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that any adequate definition of truth must meet: it must be
consistent, the set of items said to be true must be a
subset of the closed sentences (of the object language), and
for every sentence s of the object language, an instance of
schema T must be derivable as a theorem:
(T) T ( s
)
iff p .
Here, 'p' stands for s's translation in the metalanguage,
and 'T' stands for the truth-predicate being defined.
We will follow Tarski in taking more than one approach
to talking about truth. First I will give a simple sample
truth definition illustrating how the relevant parts of his
theory are supposed to work. (This theory will contain an
unreduced notion of denotation, and we will then see how
this notion can be re-defined in terms of satisfaction.) We
thus will have this as an example to point to. We also can
adopt Tarski's more general way of talking. In addition, I
will introduce the notion of a 'truth-theoretic pair' of
languages, which will give us a third way of talking.
An Example of a Truth Characterization
Except in one respect, Tarski's method of defining
truth is simple and intuitive. The complication comes in
the notion of satisfaction sequences. It would be nice to
be able to talk straightforwardly about formulas being
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satisfied by individuals, but that would make satisfaction
into a relation with an indeterminate number of places: two,
for the satisfaction of *x is wise' by Socrates; three, for
the satisfaction of ’x dances with y
' by Mary and John, and
so forth. Theoretically, it would be possible to do
semantics by defining many different satisfaction relations,
one for each number of places a predicate can have, but that
would make metatheory a mess. So Tarski contrived
satisfaction as a two-place relation: sequences satisfy
formulas
.
The underlying motivation for the construction is
combinatorial. One wants to cover all the possible ways of
lining up the elements of a domain with variables. Let S be
the set of all (denumerable) sequences of items in whatever
domain you are interested in. (So for example if there are
infinitely many different objects in the domain, some of the
sequences will have every member different, some will have
every member the same, and some will have a mixture. ) For
each positive integer n, we can consider the nth place
across all the sequences, e.g. the fifth place. Since the
set of denumerable sequences represents all the different
possible ways of arranging the objects in the domain into a
denumerable sequence, every object is going to appear in the
fifth place of some sequence or other, ditto for the seventh
place, etc. And for every two objects, there is going to be
some sequence in which the first of the two is in the fifth
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place and the second is in the seventh. Similarly for every
triple, etc.
.
In the theory below, variables are subscripted with
numbers. The theory is set up in such a way that the
numbers choose the place in the sequences the variable is
going to 'look at'. For example (as it might be) the
variables in 'x5 dances with x7
' are evaluated with respect
to the fifth and seventh places of the sequences. The
formula will be satisified by any sequence in which the item
in the fifth place dances with the item in the seventh
place. We have not quite got the whole story, but I hope I
have given enough of it that the reader can see that Tarski
k e able to define satisfaction as a two-place relation
between a sequence and a formula
.
As object-language I will use a bit of the predicate
^•^l^-ulus (it is not what Tarski used) . Let L be the sub—
calculus defined by the two names 1 a 1 and 1 b 1
, the two one—
place predicates, ‘F’and ‘G 1
,
the two—place predicate ‘I 1
,
the two truth functors 1— >’ and variables 'x', 'xl',
'x2',...and the universal quantifier symbol 'V'.
Terminology: variables and names are terms; formulas can be
open or closed; closed formulas are sentences .
Truth (for L) will be defined in E, an English-y
language containing among other things
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(1) The following translations of, respectively, 'a', 'b\
'F\ ' G 1 and 'I':
'Anchorage
'
' Boston
'
'is a city'
'is a state'
'is identical to'
(2) Syntactic Vocabulary: designators for the expressions of
L (instead of the quotational designators which are normal
in English), constructed from the following basic
expressions
(a) Designators for the basic names and predicates and for
the first variable of L: 'ay', 'be', 'ef', 'ge', 'id',
' ecks
'
.
(b) One-place function signs: 'the negation of', 'the
successor of'. (Negation is a syntactic operation, and 'the
negation of means, intuitively, the result of concatenating
” 1 with... . The successor of' is used for constructing
designations of variables other than the first one, 'x'.
E.g., 'the successor of ecks' designates 'xl'.)
(c) Two-place function signs: 'the conditionalization
of . . . with . . . 1
,
'the universal quantification of .. .with
respect to (variable)...', 'the result of applying (the
predicate )... to (the term)...'.
(d) A three-place function sign: 'the result of applying
(the predicate )... to (the terms )... and .. . .
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(Examples: Although in English the designator of 'Fa' is
(usually) " Fa'", in E the structural-descriptive designator
of Fa' is the result of applying ef to ay'. That of
VxFx
'
is 'the universal quantification of the result of
applying ef to ecks, with respect to ecks '
.
)
(3) Terminology of set theory and logic, including the
identity sign and variables for functions.
(4) Semantic Vocabulary: 'is a sentence', 'denotes',
satisifes', 'true', and 'the association of ...with (the
term )...'.
The language in which I am presently announcing all this is
neither L nor E, but English, our meta-metalanguage. Note
that the statement that 'Anchorage' translates 'a' is made
in the meta-metalanguage. I will not give the syntax of E
or specify its workings any further; rather I will rely on
its similarity to English and the reader's understanding of
English, hoping that in the interest of readability, the
reader is willing thus to collude with me in a lack of rigor
of which Tarski would no doubt have disapproved.
In some of his expositions, Tarski seemed to envision
the actual individuals as his domain of interpretation. We
will assume the actual individuals as domain. (My
exposition owes a great deal to those of Burge [1972] and
McDowell [1980].)
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-
tage
—
: definition of truth in terms of denotation and
satisfaction
Step A: denotation
ay denotes Anchorage
be denotes Boston
Step B: association
Sequence S associates object o with term t:
(i) if t = ay, then o = Anchorage;
if t = be, then o = Boston.
(ii) if t = ecks, then o = the first object in S;
if t = the successor of a variable v, then if S
associates the nth object in S with v, S
associates the n+l-th object in S with t.
Step C; satisfaction
Laws of Satisfaction:
(For the sake of readability, I will leave out the outermost
universal quantifiers. These laws thus look schematic, but
are intended to be understood with every variable
quantified
.
)
(a) S satisfies the result of applying ef to (term) t iff
what £ associates with t is a city.
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(b) S satisfies the result of applying ge to t iff what S
associates with t is a state.
(c) S satisfies the result of applying id to t and t' iff
what S associates with t is identical to what S associates
with t ' .
(d) S satisfies the negation of (formula) F iff s does not
satisfy F
(e) S satisfies the conditionalization of F with G iff if s
satisfies F, then S satisfies G.
(f) S satisfies the universal quantification of F with
respect to (variable) v iff every sequence just like S,
except perhaps in what it associates with v, satisfies F.
Step D: truth
A thing is true iff it is a sentence and every sequence
satisfies it.
Comments: (1) Our sample truth-characterization is not given
for the same object language as Tarski’s was, and it differs
in other ways too. In Tarski's object language there are no
individual constants (names), for example, although he
mentions them in other places. (2) We have only assumed and
not made explicit much of the apparatus needed for deriving
instances of Convention T in the metalanguage. (3)
Denotation is not defined as such for predicates, although
it could be: i.e., a truth characterization of a somewhat
different form could be given in which both names and
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predicates are said to denote. Commentators on Tarskian
truth often have a truth characterization of such a form in
mind when they put forward their arguments. (4) In this
theory, as in Tarski's, some apparently arbitrary
gerrymandering is done to achieve a simple and uniform
definition of truth. For example, intuitively the
evaluation of variables and the evaluation of names may seem
to be different kettles of fish, but they are subsumed under
one definition.
The end results are what is desired: 'Fa' is true, so
are tautologies, 'Ga' is not true, and so on. (Or, as we
would say it in E, the result of applying ef to ay is true,
etc. ) Now, how is the reduction of denotation to
satisfaction done ?
Stage Two : reduction of denotation to satisfaction
(name) n denotes (object) o: Every sequence of which o is
first member satisfies the result of applying id to ecks and
n, and, n = ay or every sequence of which o is first member
satisifes the result of applying id to ecks and n, and, n =
be
.
(A colloquial rendering of this reduction such as one finds
in the literature on Tarski, a rendering using quotation
marks and a terminology where objects satisfy formulas, is
this
:
33
o satisifes ’x = n' and n = 'a 1 or o satisfies
' x = n ' and n = 'b '
. )
This completes our presentation of the theory.
^ar ^-*-er we said that Tarski had two approaches to
talking about truth. The first was to give an exemplar
definition similar to the one we have just seen. The second
was to lay down a criterion that any truth definition must
meet, as described above. We will use a third approach to
talking about truth as well. Let's say that a syntax-under-
interpretation <M,i> and a syntax 0 comprises a truth
theoretic pair <<M,i>,0> iff a truth-predicate can be
adequately defined in M given i for 0. 'Interpretation' is
to be broadly enough construed so that 'natural
interpretations count. Our languages E and L above form a
truth theoretic pair (E as projected). E received its
interpretation by overlapping English and by our agreeing to
understand it in a certain way. A truth predicate is always
tied to two specific languages: the one it is defined in,
and the one it is defined for. A truth definition is really
an elaboration of a complex relationship between two
languages, and the languages deserve as much emphasis as the
predicate itself, hence the focus of this terminology. We
can also say we have a truth theoretic triple <<M,i>,0,T>
when <M,i> and 0 form a truth theoretic pair and T is a
truth characterization for 0 in M.
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Questions naturally arise about the relation between
natural languages and the artificial ones Tarski was looking
at. In his earlier writings, Tarski thought it was hopeless
to try to define truth for natural languages; in his later
writings, he suggests that one can (at best) approximate a
truth characterization for parts of natural language. By
this he appears to have meant that one can give a truth
characterization for a formal artificial language that
resembles the part of (a) natural language one is interested
in. Since the time of Montague, we have become accustomed
to the idea that natural languages count as formal
languages. The standard problem for giving a truth
characterization for a natural language is that natural
languages seem to formulate their own semantics, which leads
to paradox. But we could consider a language such as
English to be one natural language while also taking it to
be (comprised of) more than one formal language. We will
pick up again the question of the relationship between the
artificial languages for which Tarski thought truth
characterizations could be given and natural languages.
The Criticisms of Field, Putnam and Davidson
Almost as startling as the claim that truth can be
defined without any semantic primitives is the claim that
although Tarski's reduction is formally unexceptionable, it
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is nevertheless inadequate. As noted above, Field thinks
the physicalist should not be satisfied with Tarski's
reduction. He argues by analogy, bringing forward the
example of valence. If you know the valence of a chemical
element (represented by an integer), you can predict into
which chemical combinations that element will enter. Early
physicalists hoped and later physicalists showed that
chemistry could be reduced to physics. Valence can be
defined in terms of properties of atoms. But what would not
count as a proper reduction is an enumeration such as the
following
:
For any element e and valence n, e has n iff
e = potassium and n = +1 or, e is sulphur and
n = -2
, or e = ... .
(Cf. [1972] p. 363.) Field holds that an enumerational
definition of denotation makes Tarski's reduction as empty
as this one. He proposes that denotation be defined using
something like the causal picture in addition to Tarski's
theory. Those who think that Tarski legitimated truth for
physicalists have been, it would seem, misled.
Putnam (among others) sees a second defect in Tarski's
definition. He considers an instance of Convention T:
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.
Since this is supposed to be a theorem in the metalanguage
in which it is stated on the Tarskian view, no assumption
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beyond those embodied in logic and set theory is needed to
prove it. Thus it must be, like the truths of logic, a
necessary truth. But it is contingent what language we
speak, and this statement might thus have been false.
Similarly, the following might have been true, although it
isn ' t
:
'Snow is white’ is true iff snow is green.
Clearly it is not a necessary falsehood. Putnam allies
himself with Field in thinking that what is lacking is an
intension for 'true'. (See Putnam, [1979] and [1985].)
The third objection to Tarski is ultimately derived
from Davidson. (Cf. [1984], p.56.) It says that Tarski's
criterion of adequacy is met by a truth characterization
that consists just in a list of biconditionals that are
instances of Convention T and has no further articulation,
in particular, no account of denotation. For example, the
following (taken as axioms) would count as a truth
characterization
:
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
'Boston is a city' is true iff Boston is a city.
And so would the following:
'
P' is true iff snow is white
'Q' is true iff grass is green
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Thus truth would seem to have little to do with meaning; the
internal articulation of the sentences doesn't contribute to
the definition of truth. This is very unintuitive.
-These
objections all attempt to show that whatever concept it is
that Tarski has shown how to define, it is pretty far from
our ordinary conception of truth.
Defense of Tarski Against Putnam and Davidson
Putnam's difficulty was that the statement
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
is in fact contingent, while on Tarski's view it would be
necessary. The criticism applies to sentences involving the
other semantic concepts as well, e.g.
'Snow' denotes snow.
This objection raises some interesting issues, but I do not
think it refutes Tarski per se . As we will see, the
objection relies on a feature English has, but not all
languages have, the indicative mood. The artificial
languages Tarski studied do not have this feature. Tarski
did not think a truth-characterization could be given for
English directly, and his famous sentence
Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
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appears only in informal exposition. It must be regarded,
m Tarski s writing, as a stand-in for some sentence such as
'Ws' e Tr <==> Ws.
Nevertheless, it is an interesting question whether Tarskian
truth-characterizations can be given for languages having
pragmatic features such as mood or tense and whether they
can be given in such languages. Although the English
instance of Schema T is something of a special case, having
as it does both mood and tense in both metalanguage and
object language, it does need to be addressed by proponents
of Tarski s approach to truth. Even though it is a special
case, Tarski is not off the hook. If English really is so
clearly structured that we can understand it formally, and
if there should happen to be a way to understand English
'true' consistently, but no way to make English 'true'
Tarskian, then Tarski would not have cast his net widely
enough and his conception of truth would be flawed.
Let us see how Putnam's objection depends on the
indicative mood. Linguists distinguish different kinds of
mood. There is a grammatical feature of verbs sometimes
called 'mood'; loosely coordinated with it is a thing some
linguists call 'notional mood'. Roberts (in [1988])
distinguishes factual and non-factual notional mood.
Factual mood is the conventional means by which it is
indicated that a sentence is to be evaluated relative to the
speaker's world; in our case, the actual world. Non-factual
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mood indicates that there is some question about the truth
of the sentence at the speaker's world, Roberts says. If a
sentence is m the grammatical indicative and if the context
is right, then the sentence is interpreted as factual. Non-
factual mood can be expressed in a number of ways: by the
subjunctive grammatical mood, by such expressions as
'suppose that'
, ’ if . . . then . . .
' , 'would', 'could',
probably and 'supposedly'. (I guess it would be the
internal sentence that is in the non-factual mood, but
Roberts does not say.) This is as far as Roberts goes, but
we also need to note that in a sentence such as 'He must be
at the party 1
, the internal clause 'he be at the party' is
supposed to be evaluated not only with respect to the actual
world, but with respect to a selected set of others as well.
Thus there are various means of indicating at what world or
worlds a sentence or clause is to be evaluated. We refine
Roberts' view slightly by saying that a sentence in the
grammatical indicative and without modal expressions in it
is typically evaluated with respect to the speaker's world
and only with respect to the speaker's world.
Roughly, what happens when a sentence such as 'John is
tali' or 'Snow is white' is uttered in the factual mood is
this. Just as the present tense (in the right
circumstances) forces evaluation with respect to the time of
utterance, the grammatical indicative (in the right
circumstances) forces evaluation at the world of utterance.
(For our utterances, this will be the actual world.)
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Moreover
, only the actual world is relevant to evaluation:
the sentence will be counted as true if it is true in our
world, no matter how many other worlds it is false at.
Now let us return to Putnam's objection. For the
purposes of this discussion ’contingent 1 will mean
’contingently true or contingently false' and truth and
falsity will be metalinguistic truth and falsity. (I doubt
Tarski would have agreed to anything else.) It takes three
languages to state the objection: the bottom-level object
language, home of 'snow' and of 'snow is white'; its
immediate metalanguage, home of '"snow is white" is true',
of the instance of T, and of '"snow" denotes snow'; and
finally a higher metalanguage in which the claim of
contingence is made. Now, the idea I want to push is that
any semantic sentences we intuitively judge to be contingent
will be in the grammatical indicative and will have no modal
expressions in them. Only such sentences generate the
intuition. Let's consider the sentence
(S) "Snow" denotes snow.
We take (S) to be contingent, but there are closely related
sentences do not generate this intuition, though their
content is very similar. Neither (S') nor (S' 1 ) below would
do . :
(S') D ( " s " ) = s
(S' ') "Snow" denotes snow in the actual world.
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The first of these sentences is in a language that does not
have the indicative. The second has a modal expression in
it. The point is that it takes a certain type of natural
language sentence to generate the intuition of contingence,
and I think that if the reader will test out his or her
intuitions on (S') and (S' 1 ), he or she will agree that they
to generate the intuition.
I believe that with respect to Putnam's objection, the
dialectical situation is something like that in the
following scenario. Suppose someone proposes to define the
predicate 'brother' as follows:
BROTHER ( x ) <==> MALE SIBLING(x).
And suppose someone reads off the definition like this:
something is a brother just in case it is a male sibling.
Suppose further that someone else hears this and makes the
objection: the proposed definition is inadequate because it
only tells us what it is to be a brother, not what it is to
have been or to be about to be a brother.
Obviously, several things would need to be
disentangled. First, since the original definition is
stated in a language having no tenses, if the English is
meant as a pronunciation of the definition, the seeming
tense must be ignored, and the objection is not apropos. If
the English is meant as a translation
,
a question arises as
to whether it is an adequate translation. Assuming that
English sentences can be taken tenselessly, the tenseless
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version of the English sentence would count as a good
(enough) translation, and the objection can easily be
answered by pointing out that tenselessness is intended. If
on the other hand English sentences can't be taken
tenselessly (and still be English, that is), then the
translation is inadequate, and the objection perhaps exposes
the inadequacy, but without really touching the claim of
equivalence between brother and male sibling . If one simply
abandons the formal sentence and takes the objection to be
an objection to this claim
something is a brother just in case it is a
male sibling,
(i.e., to the claim made by the full-blooded English
sentence), then one reply to the objection is to ask the
objecter to take the sentence tenselessly. If the objecter
refuses to do this, perhaps on the ground that English just
is tensed and we can no more pretend we are not speaking a
tensed language than we can pretend we are not speaking in
prose, then one replies to the objecter by saying that the
concept brother has been analyzed correctly, although the
analysis has not been stated correctly by the objecter'
s
lights, and perhaps trying to state it in a way he would
find acceptable.
Except that we have a more complicated type of case
involving a layer-cake of three languages, the dialectical
situation in which we find Putnam's objection is very
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similar to that in the scenario. As for tense in the
scenario, so for the indicative here. After Tarski has made
his proposal, illustrating it intuitively with a sentence
pronounced
Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
Putnam comes along and objects that the biconditional need
not have been true. His point is approximately as relevant
as that of the objector in our scenario. Once again,
several things need to be disentangled. If the English-y
instance of Convention T is intended to go proxy for or be a
translation of some formal sentence, we should ignore the
indicative and understand the sentence in a 'moodless ' way,
if possible. If we just abandon formal language and study
the English sentence, an entirely new question arises:
whether there can be truth-theoretic pairs that yield the
following sentences with the meaning they have in English,
tense, inflection and all: " 'Snow is white' is true iff snow
is white" and "'Snow' denotes snow".
Oddly, at one point, Tarski gives the following
examples of Convention T side by side, but without
commenting on them:
'It is snowing' is true iff it is snowing
'The world war will begin in the year 1963'
is true iff the world war will begin in
the year 1963.
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(See [1956], p.404.) The passage has the air of suggesting
something about tense, but it is not clear what that
something would be. One moral that could be drawn from the
appearance of the future tense in both object language and
metalanguage is this: that every feature of a sentence that
affects meaning needs some kind of translation or other
rendering into the metalanguage. One way of rendering tense
is by tense, although that may not be the only way, and
similarly for mood.
There has not been much study of the interaction
between these three things: pragmatic features of
metalanguage, pragmatic features of object language, and
truth predicates. Of the three, the truth predicate seems
to be relatively inert, the problems we are discussing being
generated by the interaction between pragmatic features of
metalanguage and object language. In natural language, when
we use unadorned 'true' in indicative sentences, we
generally are talking about truth in the actual world,
unless something in the previous discourse or elsewhere in
the context has switched the world of evaluation. But the
localization to the actual world appears to be carried, not
by 'true', but by the indicative plus the relevant features
of context. If the content of 'true' were the same as that
of 'true at the actual world', or if it had some kind of
indexicality that demanded localization to the actual world,
there would be anomalies in such phrases as 'if such-and-
such were true' and 'not actually true'. Moreover, 'true at
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every world 1 would mean something like 'true in the actual
world at every world 1
, which is not right.
-So, it is the
indicative that needs to be studied, rather than truth £er
— * ^ True also seems to be inert with respect to tense.)
More investigation is needed, but I suspect it will
turn out that Putnam's objection is something of a red
herring. Just as the person who paired brother with male
sibling captured the concept correctly (although there is
some question how to state the analysis in different types
of languages) Tarski has captured the notion of truth
correctly, and instances of Schema (T) are necessary, even
though it is not completely clear how to state a truth
characterization in and for languages with such features as
mood and tense. And in being neutral, not itself indexical,
English 'true' resembles a formal Tarskian truth predicate,
and for most purposes it is a good-enough translation of a
such a formal predicate. We will discuss these issues a
little more in the next chapter.
Finally, we turn to Davidsons *s objection: for a
language consisting of two unarticulated sentences, ' P ' and
'Q 1
,
the following list of axioms counts as an adequate
truth characterization:
'
P' is true iff snow is white
Q' is true iff grass is green
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And, as we noted above, truth characterizations can be given
that simply ignore the inner articulation of some sentences.
The short answer to this objection is that it is a
virtue, not a defect, of Tarski’s method that truth can be
defined for a large range of languages. If truth conditions
could not be given for languages containing sentences
without internal articulation, then truth could not be
defined for the sentential calculus, and we would have no
way of saying that the sentence 'P v -P ' was true. In fact,
these seemingly degenerate cases emphasize the
characteristics of Tarski's approach in a way the more
ordinary cases do not, and we will return to them in the
fisxt chapter as part of developing a better picture of
Tarski's 'structural' conception of truth.
Three Attempts to Defend Tarski Against Field
For Field, Tarski's definition is inadequate because of
the trivial list—like quality of its rendering of
denotation: there is more to denotation than that 1 One
person who has attempted a reply is Etchemendy [Etchemendy,
1980], who accuses Field and other critics of Tarski of
failing to recognize that Tarski's characterization is
intended as stipulative rather than analytic. He uses an
analogy to explain the difference:
If I define a set, call it EVEN, as the set con-
taining all sums of two odd primes, it would be a
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confusion to object that my definition presupposed
roV^
C°^eCtneSS ° f] Goldbach ' s conjecture.
.^[W]hereG ldbach s conjecture comes in is with the claim that
of\
rLT? nUI^eS than 2 is a »eniber Of EVEN
,
for- ^ f
] defined. To be sure, the name I chose
^
bbe Set may be misleading, but the definition it-self does not thereby become a substantive claim.
([1980] p. 58)
The point seems to be that in giving a Tarskian truth
definition, one is making a stipulation that defines a
certain set. (We might for example call a certain set
containing 'Fb\ 'Fb—>Fb\ etc, which is defined as a
result of our exemplar definition above, TRUE.) To get a
substantive claim from this, according to Etchemendy, one
must introduce a primitive notion of truth
—'truth*'— and
claim that all and only the true* sentences (of the language
in question) are members of that set. (Cf. [1980], pp. 58-
9. )
Of Field, Etchemendy says that he 'misdiagnoses' the
difference between two styles of definition. Accusing Field
of misunderstanding Tarski's aim (or seeming to - it is
unclear), he says that in Field's view, Tarski's aim was the
reduction of the semantic concept of truth to concepts
acceptable to a physicalist, and that this is a mistake. He
then speculates about how such a mistake came to be made:
Where Field was misled, it seems, is in thinking that
the source of the perceived difference between recursive
and list-like definitions has to do with a reduction
of the semantic facts to facts in virtue of which those
semantic facts hold. But the perceived difference has
nothing to do with such a reduction and indeed arises
only in claims involving the unreduced notion of truth.
([1980], p. 59, fn. 7)
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This criticism of Field seems to embody a number of
confusions. First, Field is worried about Tarski’s method
of defining basic denotation, not the recursive clauses in
Tarskian truth-characterizations. Etchemendy says nothing
about how the issue of list-likeness versus recursiveness
bears on denotation. Actually, the original specification
of the denotation function in our example above and its re-
definition in terms of satisfaction are equally list-like.
Second, although Tarski did have some aims not
emphasized by Field, this would not be inconsistent with his
having had other aims as well. In ours and in Tarski's
exemplar definitions of truth, the truth predicates are
indeed, from a formal point of view, defined predicates, and
Tarski's reduction of all the semantic notions to
satisfaction is, yes, part of his attempt to eliminate them
for the purpose of showing consistency. But Tarski did not
randomly choose 'Tr' as his truth predicate! He clearly
thought his work had a bearing on certain issues of interest
to philosophers. (See his remarks in [Tarski, 1944].)
Third, Etchemendy
' s claims about the occurrence of
stipulation are open to question. Let's take Tarski's two
approaches to talking about truth separately and try to
apply Etchemendy' s remarks to them in turn, starting with
exemplar truth definitions. Etchemendy (apparently) is
claiming that a definition of truth such as the one above is
stipulative. (Again, he does not say how this bears on
denotation or whether the definition of denotation is
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supposed to be stimulative too.) But both in the case of
our definition and in the case of Tarski 's, the definitions
are exemplar and as such are well-embedded in their contexts
and thus not asserted. When you get right down to it, I did
not stipulate meanings for 'true (relative to L)
' and
•denotes (relative to L)
.
if i hadf i wou ld be able tQ
report truly here that 'b' denotes Boston in the language we
are speaking, which I cannot. I did not extend our language
with any stipulations. The apparent stipulation has no
force in the larger context. 'Defined' (in the relevant
sense) does not entail 'stipulated'. Definition is
independent of context, but not stipulation: it is relative
to context in the sense that the same sentences may be in
one context of investigation stipulative of meaning and in
another not. In discussions of Tarski, exemplar truth
definitions generally involve artificial languages and may
give the appearance of stipulating meanings for those
languages. But unless they also appear asserted on their
own, meaning does not actually get stipulated.
Well, what does happen when a truth definition or
characterization is asserted ? Whether the characterization
is stipulative or analytic largely depends on the intentions
of the person who puts it forward. Someone who offers, say,
truth conditions for sentences of English containing mass
terms might well intend this as a contribution toward
analyzing some intuitive conception of truth. The mere fact
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of having written down truth conditions in Tarskian form
would not defeat this intention.
Now let's turn to the second way of talking about
truth. Do Etchemendy's remarks apply ? Well, one cannot
say that Tarski was stipulatively defining metalinguistic
truth m general, since there is no one overarching truth
predicate. He did stipulate the conditions under which it
is possible to construct in a metalanguage "methodologically
correct and materially adequate" definitions of semantic
concepts. Here his remarks were stipulative, but with an
obvious intended application. Also, they were normative:
Tarski's idea was that if one wants to talk coherently about
truth, one had better have a metalanguage and an object
language and make sure they form a truth-theoretic pair. -I
conclude that Etchemendy's defense of Tarski does not
succeed
.
Another who has made the attempt is Soames . He too
interprets Field s criticism. He holds Field to be saying
that a genuine reduction must show semantic facts to be
supervenient on physical facts. But Tarski's 'reduction' of
'b' denotes Boston
eventually boils down to this, says Soames:
'b' = 'b' and Boston = Boston,
(or as we'd say in E, "be = be and Boston = Boston"), which
seems not to get us any farther toward discovering the facts
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on which the reference of 'b' supervenes. Relatedly,
according to Soames, the former seems to be contingent and
the latter necessary. He connects this second objection
with one we have already mentioned, Putnam's.
Inspired by Lewis [1975], Soames proposes one reply for
both objections: we should conceive of language in such a
way as to reject both the demand that semantic properties be
dependent on speakers and the demand that truth conditions
be contingent. (Similar demands are appropriate for a
related theory of language use, he thinks.) He wants us to
think of a (standard first-order) language as a triple
consisting in (i) a family of sets representing the various
categories of well-formed expressions of the language, (ii)
a domain of objects, and (iii) an "interpretation" function
assigning objects to names, sets to predicates, etc.. He
says
Let J be a class of such languages. Truth can now
be defined in nonsemantic terms for variable 'L'
in J in a straightforward Tarskian fashion. The only
significant change from before is that the notions of
primitive denotation are no longer given language-
specific list definitions, but rather are defined for
variable 'L' using the "interpretation" functions built
into the languages. In particular, a name n refers
to an object o in a language L iff [the interpretation,
for that language, of] n = o. ([1984], p. 425.)
The proposal here is that we think and speak about language
sub specie aeternitatis
,
or from a 'God's eye' point of
view: from the outside, if you will, rather than from the
inside. Soames puts it very nicely:
...languages are abstract objects, which can
be thought of as bearing their semantic
properties essentially. There is no possibility
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that expressions of a language might havedenoted something other than what they dodenote ; or that sentences of a language mighthave had different truth conditions. Any
variation in semantic properties (across worlds)is a variation in languages. ([ 1984 ], p. 425 )
I think this is a step in the right direction, but that it
is not enough to answer either Field's or Putnam's objection
fully, and that it has special problems of its own. It also
is not very Tarskian in certain respects. Let's examine the
issues more closely.
Each of the two objections has more to it than Soames
supposes. Putnam makes his objection by pointing out an
intuition that the following are contingent!
'Snow' denotes snow
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.
Early in his article, Soames comments that Tarski thought
truth could only be defined for artifical languages, and in
so saying, he seems to brush English aside. Then, after
presenting Putnam's objection, he says this in reply: let's
not think of the sentences as contingent. Now, which
sentences are we to refrain from thinking of as contingent?
Formal ones, such as 'T("s") <==> s' generate no clear
intuition of contingence, as discussed above. The English
sentences do. But about these, the suggestion 'let's not
think of them as contingent' provokes the following
response: Well, okay, if you insist, -but are they
contingent as we ordinarily understand them?. The formal-
mode analogue of the move Soames has made is to say 'let's
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abandon ways of talking in which we take inflection
seriously and instead just use Mathematicalese when talking
about language and truth'. Again, okay, but it's not as if
inflected speech will thereby cease to exist. The challenge
Putnam's observation presents to the defender of Tarski is
not to show that we can talk coherently about truth and
denotation (Tarski himself showed we can); the challenge is
to show that the way we do talk about truth and denotation
in English is, when coherent, Tarskian. Soames does not
help us with this.
Soames might wish to say that the English sentences are
non-contingent too and to remind us that his observations
about language use are intended to explain the apparent
contingence of English instances of T. If the realm of
phenomena Soames had in mind when he said 'use' were
pragmatic phenomena such as mood and tense, and if he had
something to say about them, I might agree, but he has
speaker meaning and convention in mind. No one has ever
questioned that 'Jones uses "snow" to mean snow' was
contingent. What we want to know about is '"Snow" denotes
snow '
.
Soames 's observations also do not answer Field; they
leave the intuitive oomph of Field's objection untouched.
Even someone sitting on God's shoulder might want to know,
is this all there is to denotation, a list-like correlation
for each language, i.e. a list of lists? After Soames has
had his say, we are still stuck with lists.
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Tarski clearly was thinking of language from a God's
eye point of view (in a way not much different from what
Soames proposes). it is far from clear what the
relationship between tensed and inflected ways of talking
and ways of talking typified by formal languages is or ought
to be and whether and how they can be mixed. At heart, the
problem
-the
' necessitation effect'- is the same problem as
the one that arises in construing the having of properties
as set membership: 'Rover is spotted' is contingent; 'Rover
6 { x
|
x is spotted }
' has a claim to being necessary.
There are a host of metaphysical and linguistic issues here,
(and they are not ones that the distinction between language
and used language is going to be able to address).
I mentioned that in addition to failing to answer Field
and Putnam completely, another problem is introduced by
Soames s proposal. His wording is a little ambiguous, but
he seems to envision definitions only of truth predicates of
the following form: 'true in such-and-such language'.
Denotation seems to be a three-termed relation: a denotes x
in L. This would seem to rule out from the beginning the
idea of giving Tarskian truth-characterizations for natural
languages or parts of them. English comes equipped just
with the one truth predicate, and when it is used, typically
we see exhibited, but not reported, what language the object
language is. Of course, one can also add 'in French', or
whatever, when appropriate, but the point is that there are
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more truth-theoretic pairs out there than Soanes makes room
for
.
The third attempt to answer Field's objection comes
from Putnam [1979]. (The selfsame Putnam who finds himself
compelled to criticize Tarski on other grounds.) His
defense occurs in a more specialized context than ours. He
is thinking about the truth of the statements of science,
and he institutes the assumption that all of empirical
science has been formalized in some language and that truth
has been defined for that language in Tarskian style. He is
considering the questions whether such a Tarskian truth
characterization adequately captures the correspondence view
of truth (of science) and to what extent Tarski's theory is
realist. He argues that it is to a certain extent a realist
theory and then brings forward Field's objection, asking
whether it should stir uneasiness in the heart of someone
who holds the position he has just argued for. He thinks it
should not, giving two related defenses. One defense goes
as follows:
'"Electron" refers to electrons' - how else
should we say what 'electron' refers to from
within a conceptual system in which 'electron'
is a primitive term? ([1972], p.32)
Field has a fairly easy reply here. Putnam begs the
question by trading on the intuitive English meaning of
'refers' in his example sentence, i.e. in the sentence.
'Electron' refers to electrons.
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A term that in intuitive English better captures the
conception of denotation to which Field is objecting is 'is
functionally correlated with'. If we put it into the
example sentence, we get:
Electron' is functionally correlated with electrons.
Now, how e lse should we say" what electron refers to from
within a conceptual system in which 'electron' is a
primitive term? Field's reply is obvious: we should use a
term that expresses a meatier conception of denotation,
'refers', for example. That is his point.
Putnam's other line of defense is to say that although
the specification of the denotation function is list-like,
the list has a special structure which is illuminating:
'Electron' refers to electrons
'Dog' refers to dogs
A list of just this structure is needed to define truth,
Putnam holds. Unfortunately he does not say what the
structure in question is, exactly, but he compares the list
of denoters and denotees to instances of schema T, and he
speaks of 'triviality'. (See [1972], pp. 31-32.)
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It is not competely clear what is going on in this
passage, but Putnam seems to be conflating two different
kinds of triviality. The sentences
Electron refers to electrons
and
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
are apparently a priori and in this way trivial. However to
say of something that it is listlike is not to attribute
this kind of triviality to it. Moreover even this kind of
triviality depends on the truth theory in question being
homophonic, which is not a necessary feature of Tarskian
characterizations: if instead of using quotation marks
we gave words names, e.g., 'Mutt', 'Jeff', etc., the
specification of the denotation function would not have a
particularly illuminating structure, even if we did use
' refers '
:
Mutt refers to electrons
Jeff refers to dogs
Field of course recognizes that a list of a certain
structure is needed, but he thinks more is needed as well.
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CHAPTER III
THE STRUCTURAL CONCEPTION OF TRUTH
Tarski Defended Against Field
Simply put, our problem is, does Tarski's theory
present as defective a reduction as Field's psuedo-reduction
of valence? Is
n denotes x iff
n = 'b' and x satisfies 'x = Boston' or n = 'c' and
x satisfies 'x = Chicago' or....
as defective a reduction as
e has n iff
e = potassium and n = +1 or e = sulphur and
n = -2 or e = . . . .
?
In my opinion, the answer is no. By and large, by the
standards of the positivists, a concept was shown to be
respectable if it could be defined in terms of physical
properties or the notions of logic and set theory or both.
Making a notion such as truth respectable to the physicalist
does not require defining the notion in terms of physical
properties (such as those involved in the causal theory of
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reference) if logical ones will do. Tarski said he would
show how to define truth (for a given language) in purely
logical terms
, and that is what he did. It may be that his
theory is defective or incomplete, but not for the reason
Field gives.
A better analogy would be one where some concept is
successfully defined in purely logical terms. This would
provide a model to study. And if we could find a concept
defined in purely logical terms where an enumeration was an
essential part of its meaning, that would be even better.
Here one is tempted by the truth function 'and'. 'And'
actually shares some of the predicate 'true"s more
mysterious features. Like 'true', 'and' seems to be otiose.
All that P and Q' means is, it seems, meant by the two
sentence discourse 'P. Q. '
.
All that can be accomplished by
asserting P and Q' can (apparently) be accomplished by
asserting the conjuncts separately. There is no physically
observable relation of andness to which 'and' corresponds.
Moreover
,
and ' does not seem to be able to be defined in
behavioristic or operational terms. One might even be
tempted to conclude that 'and' has no cognitive content,
that it is used merely in a stylistic variant of a two-
sentence discourse. Conceivably, someone might mount a
campaign to expunge 'and' from a scientifically correct
vocabulary.
Could we not rescue 'and' from this fate with the
following observations? On the semantic side, we say that
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•and 1 expresses a truth function, a function that takes the
truth values of the component sentences of a conjunctive
sentence to truth value. Thus the semantics of ‘and 1 is
given using the notions of 'truth 1 and 'function 1
. Bringing
these two notions forward, of course, is not enough: we must
say which truth function we are talking about. It is the
one that takes the truth of both conjuncts to true
, the
falsity of but one conjunct to false
, and the falsity of
both conjuncts to false.
-Note that this is an enumeration.
Assuming for the moment that truth is a purely logical
notion, one might say that 'and' has been defined in purely
logical terms.
-Is there anything amiss here from the
physical istic point of view? Is there any deficiency in
this account of the meaning of 'and' that is owed to the
presence of an enumeration? To seek further for some
underlying property, 'andness' that explains the patterns of
'
T
1
1
s and 'F' 's in the truth table seems perverse. This,
one wants to say, is all there is to 'and 1 . Even to those
who like intensional functions, it would be proper to
maintain that this pattern, this list, this correlation, is
essential to the meaning of 'and 1 . Only a physicalist who
was also a complete nominalist and wanted to eschew such
abstract objects as correlations, could be dissatisfied.
(And then the burden of proof would shift.)
What I have just outlined is a view about the meaning
of 'and' that is un-Tarskian and oversimplified to the point
of incorrectness. Nevertheless, we can give a defense
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against Field that is based on its main ideas. One problem
with the above conception of the meaning of ’and' is that it
ignores mere formulas that have a conjunction symbol in
them. But for our purposes we can continue to ignore them
and just specify part of the meaning of 'and'. We can say
something like this:
An interpreted language L has a truth-functional
sentential conjunctor iff there is at least one
true sentence of L and at least one false
sentence of L and there is some
syntactic operation, C, of L such that
for any (closed) sentences, F and G, of L,
(i) if F is true and G is true, the result
of applying C to F and G is true
(ii) if F is true and G is false, the result
of applying C to F and G is false
(iii) if F is false and G is true, the result
of applying C to F and G is false, and
(iv) if F is false and G is false, the result
of applying C to F and G is false
Tarski's theory makes truth (and denotation, which we
will get to in a minute) a structural notion, like 'and'.
Metalinguistic truth is parasitic on the tightly correlated
structures of two languages. It is present partly in virtue
of two languages of appropriate structure existing. As
explained above, I think we should take seriously Tarski's
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claim to have reduced truth to purely logical notions. To
defend Tarski, we should try to use this idea to reply to
Field. Field's analogy is only moving in the absence of an
alternative model, which we now have. It remains to make
the extension to denotation.
To the person perched on God's shoulder who wants to
know, 'is this all there is to denotation - is it just a
list of lists?' Tarski can say 'there is a such a concept
of denotation, and it is the one relevant to defining
metalinguistic truth'.
In order to simplify the discussion, let me return to
the original definition of denotation for L. We noted that
it and its Tarskian reduction were equally enumerational
,
and since it is enumerationality that is at stake, it will
not matter for present purposes which we use. Denotation
for L, then, is simply the (functional) pairing of 'a' with
Anchorage and 'b* with Boston.
Here is what Tarski can say to Field: it is the fact of
correlation that contributes to the presence of
metalinguistic truth and falsity, not how the correlation is
done, i.e., how it is physically realized. (Martians, after
all, might do it differently than we do and yet use the same
symbols. And even in our everyday life, different physical
processes can embody denotation.) If enough structure is
present, however it is realized, there will be
metalinguistic truth and falsity.
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Just as we ask which truth function ‘and 1 represents in
English, we ask which denotation function ’denotes' (from E
above) represents; the answer, given in essential terms, is
a list: the one that assigns Anchorage to ’a’ and Boston to
'b'. Of course, where we happen to have a language that is
used by humans, we can also pick out the function in non-
essential terms: the one that associates with 'George Bush'
the object at the other end of a certain actual causal
chain, etc. What is needed for defining metalinguistic
truth is a determination of referents for names, not any
particular physical realization of such a determination.
Metalinguistic truth supervenes on structure, not on any
Parbi cu lar kind of physical events that happen to exhibit
that structure.
More needs to be said about the structural conception
of truth and what it involves. More will be said shortly.
But first, let us measure Tarski's theory up against Field's
with respect to the problems discussed in the previous
chapter. Field's theory is Tarski's with denotation
construed as actual causal chains. Although Tarski has
replies to the various objections that have been aimed at
him, it might nevertheless be the case that Field's theory
is preferable: maybe Field can explain the apparent
contingence of certain instances of Schema T, or maybe he is
better at dealing with inflected languages, or maybe his
view has some advantage for the materialist over Tarski's.
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Does Field's Emendation Improve Tarski?
Does Field improve on Tarski in any way? For
example
, does he give us any hint about how to construct a
truth-characterization that either makes instances of T
contingent or gets truth theory and inflection to walk hand
in hand when he insists on real denotation? Or does he gain
advantages for the physicalist by limiting denotation to
certain actual historical processes?
Unfortuately
, there are literally dozens of different
ways in which to construe Field's emendation of Tarski. Let
me list some of the distinctions in virtue of which there
are so many ways. First, there is the distinction between
individual truth characterizations and the general criterion
of adequacy. Field makes his initial proposal in connection
with an exemplar truth characterization for an artificial
language. Now he obviously does not think that one should
follow his advice about denotation only for that one
language. But it is unclear how general his proposal is
supposed to be. As we will see below, emending the general
criterion is a questionable enterprise.
Even if we can decide where to emend Tarski, it is not
clear exactly how Field is proposing to do it. Should the
words 'actual' or 'actually' (and their brothers in other
languages) be used in the clause for denotation? Always?
Sometimes? ('In the actual world' does appear in Field's
schema, but in parentheses. One doesn't know whether it is
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intended as an aside or as something else.) Could the
effect that Field wants, whatever it is, be achieved merely
by limiting the domain of any acceptable truth
characterization to actual objects? Must the object-
language names in a truth characterization actually have
been attached to real individuals (by dubbing)? Is Field
proposing that a conception of denotation be used into the
analysis of which the concept of causal chain enters? Or
would it be all right if truth characterizations were
limited so that it just worked out that there is never said
to be denotation except where there are in fact causal
chains? (What about the Martians?)
A third complication is introduced by the fact that
Field himself gives two proposals, as we described in
Chapter One. The second is supposed to be a straightforward
generalization of the first (from truth to truth at a
world), but in virtue of some of the things we said in the
previous paragraph, there is more than one candidate for
'the' generalization of the initial proposal.
A fourth complication is introduced by the fact that we
are asking whether Field has improved on Tarski with respect
to certain kinds of indexicality . We are entertaining the
idea that Tarskian truth characterizations can be given in
and/or for languages with pragmatic features. This suggests
a four-fold way of classifying truth-theoretic pairs: (a)
ones where neither metalanguage nor object language has
pragmatic features (Tarski's original exemplar truth
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characterization was like this); (b) ones where the object
language has pragmatic features, but the metalanguage does
not (such a relationship between metalanguage and object
language would be similar to that found in the standard
(model-theoretic ) theories of tense and indexicals); ( c )
ones where both metalanguage and object language have
pragmatic features (our English instance of T may be part of
such a pair); and (d) ones where the object language does
not have pragmatic features while the metalanguage does
(sometimes it is said that the meaning of artificial
language is derived from that of natural language, that a
natural language is "the ultimate metalanguage" for an
artificial language). For present purposes we will assume
all four combinations are possible. (We will discuss some
questions about this assumption below.
)
The combinatorial possibilities are horrendous. The
cheap way out is just to say that it is unclear what Field
intends and leave it at that. I will not grind through all
the combinations, but I will comment on a few of the more
salient ones.
A proposal to emend the general criterion of adequacy
with something like the following stipulation is too
extreme
;
Truth cannot be characterized for a
( denotational ) language unless
the denoters and denotees listed in the
characterization are in fact connected by
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causal chains.
One effect of this stipulation would be to rule out the idea
that truth can be defined for merely imaginary languages,
even imaginary languages whose names and predicates are
actually betokened. (E.g., one can imagine 'stone
languages' whose expressions are configurations of stones.)
Which would probably be all right with Field, though not
with Tarski. But here is something one would hope Field
would find objectionable. Although we can probably get
temporary stipulation of meaning for artificial languages to
fit under the causal umbrella somehow, truth
characterizations like ours above in which meaning does not
actually get stipulated and which never emerge from indirect
discourse would not be allowed to count as truth
characterizations
.
-This seems too extreme.
From the standpoint of trying to get truth theory and
inflection to walk hand in hand, the use of 'actual
' or
'actually' is bound to cause trouble. We hoped to be able
to characterize truth and denotation (for certain languages)
not from a God's eye point of view. In a case like this
'Snow' actually denotes snow
the adverb ensures a necessary truth where we hoped for a
contingent one. In a case like this
'b' actually denotes Boston
the use of the adverb ensures a necessary falsehood.
It is far from clear that whatever advantages Field's
approach secures for the materialist point of view, these
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advantages cannot be achieved without emending Tarski so
drastically. For example, Tarski took the expressions of a
language to be classes of tokens
-which were physical
objects- of certain sizes and shapes. Perhaps if we simply
confined denoters and denotees to actual objects, that would
be enough for Field.
Now I would like to say a little more about the
structural conceptions of truth and denotation.
The Structural Conceptions of Truth and Denotation
An answer has been given to Field's criticism, but what
exactly is involved in the structural conceptions of truth
and denotation? In fact, there are two questions: what is
involved, and, how should we talk about it in English?
There is not space to undertake a detailed comparison of the
structural conception of truth with other conceptions, but
some questions are easily answered. We will consider
whether Tarski's theory is a correspondence theory and also
whether according to it 'true' (or other truth predicate) is
redundant. In the next section, we will discuss how to talk
about (structural) truth in languages like English.
Is Tarski's theory a correspondence theory of truth?
This question as it is phrased does not really get at the
issues, and it needs to be replaced by a cluster of
questions: In our exemplar truth characterization, is 'true'
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a correspondence? A correspondence with reality? l s it the
case that for any truth characterization, truth will be a
correspondence? A correspondence with reality? if there is
a way of giving in (part of) the inflected language, English
a truth characterization for another part of English and of
defining 'true', will the result define 'true' as
correspondence with reality? For present purposes, let us
assume that reality and actuality are the same thing.
Truth i£ always a correspondence on Tarski's view. In
our exemplar characterization above, truth is a
correspondence with reality: 'Fb\ for example corresponds
to Boston's being a city. In Tarski's intuitive examples in
his informal discussions, he never contemplates unreal
objects. However, there is nothing in Tarski's prescribed
method for defining truth that rules out a domain containing
merely possible objects, (although the consistency
requirement would prevent certain kinds of things from
counting as truth characterizations). So the answer to the
question whether truth is correspondence with reality in
every allowable truth characterization is no.
If a truth definition were given that captured the
English first level 'true', would it define truth as a
correspondence with reality ? This question is hard to
answer without first deciding how we would divvy up Natural
English into formal languages, and what we think about such
expressions of English as 'Santa Claus'. However, the lack
of anomaly of 'true in some other world' and the other
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expressions we cited above seems to suggest that the answer
would be no, as does the case of truth characterizations in
indirect discourse. (An interesting question: could
adequacy conditions for defining 'actually true' be stated?)
Are truth predicates redundant? In particular, is the
(first-level) English 'true', if it can be defined
Tarskianly
, redundant? Let us take as our example
Snow is white' is true.
Whether we want to say this is redundant depends on what we
mean by 'redundant'. I take this notion to have an
epistemological component. The idea is that if we hear and
believe these two sentences
Snow is white
'Snow is white' is true,
we acquire no information from the second that we had not
already acquired from the first.
A truth predicate is otiose in the sense mentioned
but not redundant. If we assume a background logic
of high enough order, we can always define truth for a
language, and such a definition will add no new physical
concepts or logical ones beyond what we have already
assumed. But that does not mean that we cannot acquire new
information from the second of the two sentences above. It
helps to think of 'true' as having a status more like that
of the logical connectives than like that of a predicate
such as 'green'. "Snow is white and snow is white" differs
from "Snow is white" in that it exhibits, without reporting,
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the presence of conjunction. Similarly, '"Snow is white'' is
true' exhibits without reporting the presence of a truth-
theoretic pair. The information is pragmatically rather
than semantically imparted, but it is universally imparted:
every utterance of the sentence will pragmatically impart,
or exhibit, this information. (We might say that a sentence
reports its truth conditions and exhibits whatever must be
true of its context of utterance in order for it to be
u ^-^ ere(3 truly, minus its truth conditions.)
In Chapter Two, we remarked that the 'degenerate' cases
of truth definitions expose the character of Tarski's
conception of truth more clearly than the standard cases.
One thing they illustrate is the following rather surprising
fact: truth is independent of denotation in the sense that
there are some truth characterizations where truth is
defined without denotation being specified for the object
language. Also we should note that a characterization where
the sentences said to be true were all logical truths would
count as a truth characterization. Tarski's conception of
truth allows truth to be defined when sentence-by-sentence
translation between metalanguage and object language exists,
but not a more articulated translation relation. This
allows truth characterizations to be given even for signals.
Given the following somewhat elliptical stipulation of
meaning for Signalese, 'one if by land, two if by sea', and
the obvious translation of Signalese into English, it would
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be correct to say that the signal given to Paul Revere was
true
.
Some may regard these cases as bad ones for Tarski. I
think they illustrate the breadth and power of his theory.
(Tautologies of the sentential calculus are true, and, the
British did come by sea.) But his conception of truth does
have some rather unintuitive consequences. Earlier, we
contemplated 'the language of the stones', and such a thing
-
ould count as a language containing true sentences by
Tarski s lights. At one point, Tarski worries about the
fact that the class of all expressions of his object
language is infinite. He says
Normally expressions are regarded as the products
of human activity (or as classes of such products).
From this standpoint, the supposition that there
are infinitely many expressions appears to be
obviously nonsensical. But another possible
interpretation of the term 'expression' presents
itself: we could consider all physical bodies of
a particular form and size as expressions. The
kernel of the problem is then transferred to the
domain of physics. The assertion of the infinity
of the number of expressions is then no longer
senseless and even forms a special consequence of
the hypotheses which are normally adopted in
physics or in geometry. ([1956], p.174 fn. 2)
Tarski puts no further constraints on what can count as
linguistic expressions. Is Tarski committed to the idea
that stone walls, e.g., betoken true sentences? His wording
is uncharacteristically ambiguous, but he may be. But it is
very easy to limit Tarski's conception of truth to get rid
of any cases one finds displeasing. For example, one can
rule out the language of the stones by limiting syntax to
humanly usable languages, or even to humanly usable
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languages all of whose basic vocabulary is actually used.
One can also define a more limited conception of truth that
would rule out certain 'degenerate' cases by demanding at
least as much articulation in an object language sentence as
in its metalanguage translation. (One can if one feels so
moved
.
)
I hope this discussion has given the reader a feel for
the Tarskian conception of truth and for the differences
between it and Field's conception of it.
Talking About Truth and Denotation in English
Discussion of Tarskian truth can give rise to a funny
phenomenon. While the set-theoretic facts with respect to a
given truth characterization are perfectly clear, we
nevertheless can find ourselves saying some bizarre-sounding
things when describing those facts in ordinary English,
using 'true', 'language', 'denotes' and so on. For example,
in considering certain languages
—not English—, one might be
moved to say "'Snow is green' is true. There are two sorts
of questions one might ask in the face of this phenomenon.
First, how can we talk colloquially about Tarskian truth and
not mislead? Second, how do we talk about truth in English,
and is our talk Tarskian? The first question raises what is
largely a practical problem. The second question is much
more interesting. As wide as Tarski cast his net, maybe it
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was not wide enough. In this section, I do what I can
toward showing that he in fact did cast his net widely
enough, although all I can do here is look at a few
preliminary indicators.
Are there truth theoretic triples where the
metalanguage and/or the object language have pragmatic
features? Does Natural English contain languages that form
the truth theoretic pairs that go into such triples? Do any
of them yield our sentence,
’Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white,
with the meaning we take it to have in Natural English,
tense, inflection and all? Another interesting question is
whether, if there are such pairs, there are constraints on
what kinds of pragmatic features can appear in each member
of such a pair. (As we will see in a moment, some
considerations seem to suggest that such a pair must be
'hetero-pragmatic
'
)
.
Another set of questions arises from contemplating the
things we are led to say in English when we use 'denotes'
and 'true' to describe parts of truth characterizations.
The Tarskian conception of truth seems to require us to make
a lot of rather unintuitive claims if we want to use
English: e.g., that 'snow is green' is true, that 'snow'
denotes grass, and, worst of all, that 'snow is green' is
both true and false. The structures are just there, after
all, and these sentences seem to describe them. (With
respect to this set of questions, I will suggest that in
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English there are some pragmatic constraints on assertions
of semantic facts.)
Our two main points of focus will be whether it is
possible to have truth theoretic pairs where features such
as tense and inflection are taken seriously and what it
might be like to use such pairs - is it like what we do when
we describe semantic facts in English? I cannot answer all
the questions I have raised, but I will suggest that nothing
yet rules out the idea that English contains truth theoretic
pairs, and I will suggest that pragmatic constraints are
both necessary and formulable for semantic talk in English.
The rest of this chapter will be somewhat speculative.
Nothing rules out the existence of English truth-
theoretic triples ab initio . Somewhere in a footnote,
Kripke briefly mentions the possibility of having a
metalanguage with pragmatic features, without saying
anything more about it. Earlier, we speculated that Tarski
might have believed that tense would need to have a
translation or other rendering in the metalanguage. As far
as I know, no one has studied the issues I have been raising
in any depth. But there is a known puzzle that is relevant
to them and which points up some of the issues here, and the
puzzle shows up in these three statements:
(A) 'I am tali' is true iff I am tall
(B) 'Socrates will sit' is true iff Socrates will sit.
(C) 'A woman is President' is true iff a woman is president.
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(A) is incorrect
-it is said- because it is not the case
that the sentence
' I am tali' is true just in case the
utterer of (A)
-me- is tall. (b) is incorrect because
Socrates is sitting’ has truth conditions even though
Socrates is dead and will never sit again. And, if (C) were
correct, since a woman isn't President, it would seem 'a
woman is President' can never be true, which is wrong (we
hope). Thus, (A), (B) and (C) are lacking in a certain kind
of generality that one is accustomed to seeing in truth
conditions, and if that generality is to be attained, the
pragmatic features of object language and metalanguage
cannot match so closely that there is homophony.
-Or so it
seems
.
Actually, things are not so simple. First, there are
Wittgensteinian ineffability problems about stating these
objections. For example, (A) appeared in indirect
discourse, quoted in effect, and was in point of fact not
localized to me, C.G.. Second, these objections do not take
the tense and inflection seriously of the ’is' that sits
just before the 'true'. In fact, one might claim, 'Socrates
will sit' is. (now) true just in case Socrates will sit.
Third, why is generality not achieved, for example in the
case of tense, by making sure instances of T using enough
different tenses to cover all times are given? We are used
to semantic theories where the metalanguage is more or less
formal and completely lacking in pragmatic features and
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where generality is achieved by explicit universal
quantification over certain sorts of things. The standard
theories of tense and indexicals are like this, and object
language and metalanguage are thus 'hetero-pragmatic’ in
them. But it doesn't have to be so. (Given that the
project is to define truth, not explain how indexicals
work. )
Now let's look at our second problem. The structural
conception of truth seems to lead us, if we are to describe
it in English, to make a lot of crazy-sounding claims: that
'snow is green' is true, and so on. As we noted earlier,
the structures are just there, and such statements seem to
describe (part of) them.
Here is a suggestion. Perhaps what happens is that
utterances of
'Snow' denotes grass
and
'Snow is green' is true
give rise to cognitive dissonance, so that we reject them,
without the things claimed being false. Maybe we read the
quotational part of the sentence, decide by a subconscious
induction that what we have in front of us is all English,
and then absorb the rest of the sentence and reject the
claim as a claim about English. So, in the interest of
sitting your total evidence set, let me run this example by
you
:
Chat
’ means cat
.
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False, right ? Fooled you 1 1 meant the French word, which
does mean cat. Are you now so inclined to reject
'Snow' denotes grass ?
Finally, let us consider our worst cases.
Snow is white' is true and 'Snow is white' is false
and
'Snow is white' is true and false.
The former is not so bothersome once we get it in our head
that the sentences may belong to different (interpreted)
languages. (Though perhaps it would be solecistic to
express ourselves in such a way.) The latter is perhaps
^orkidden by some constraint on the interpretation of
utterances that says that a single token gets projected to a
single interpreted type.
In sum, all these considerations suggest that it
well be possible to reconcile English and Tarski.
may
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CHAPTER IV
FIELD'S THEORY
Statement of Field's Theory
In another well-known paper, 'Mental Representation'
([1978]), Field wants to show that it is possible to give a
ma ^ er
-'- a l istical ly adequate account" of mental properties
and relations, that is, an account that shows them not to be
irreducibly mental". He focusses mainly on belief. He
gives two accounts of belief, one for the friends of
propositions, and the other for the enemies of propositions
(of whom he is one). I will only discuss the first account,
for several reasons. First, it is the one Stalnaker has in
rni.nd. Second, the issues are much less clearly joined with
respect to the translation account. (Even as it is, there
is a bit of slippage between what Field says and what
Stalnaker criticizes.) Also, a discussion of the
translation account would require a lengthy discussion of
translation and of Quine's ideas, the inspiration for
Field's approach.
The core of both accounts is the postulation of
internal language and the claim that there is a relation,
belief*, that holds between a person and a sentence of her
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language (that she understands). Borrowing
([1975]), Field says that a person believes
just in case the person explicitly stores S
obvious consequence of sentences the person
stores. Belief* and belief are related as
(Apparently, 'p' i s intended to be schemati
from Dennett
* a sentence
or S is an
explicitly
follows
.
c
. ) :
S
A person X believes that p iff for some S,
X believes* S and S means that p.
(Cf. [1978], p.80.) Actually Field defines a broader
concept that allows animals to have beliefs, but we will
just look at the narrower concept.) Field takes belief* to
be unproblematic from a materialist point of view and holds
that meaning is unproblematic too, if construed as follows.
A sentence means a proposition, and a proposition is
understood as a set of worlds. A sentence means the set of
worlds at which it is true. Truth at a world is defined
using as a basis truth at the actual world, and a Tarskian
truth characterization is used. The atomic clause would
look like this (says Field):
'Pb' is true at w iff
(i) there is some individual x that b denotes (in
the actual world),
(ii) there is some property Z that P stands for
(in the actual world), and
(iii) in w, x exists and has Z.
([1978], p . 86
)
Denotation is done Kripkeanly; Field thinks standing—for can
be done in a materialistically acceptable way. All the
properties and relations postulated in the theory are
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reasonably materialistic and do not require mysterious
semantic relations that jump across worlds. Thus Field has
he thinks, given an account of a mental relation that will
satisfy the materialist.
Stalnaker's Criticisms of Field
Stalnaker propounds a number of objections to this
view. They fall into three general kinds: (1) Field fails
in his effort to expunge intentional relations, (2) Tarskian
truth theory can't play the role Field wants it to play, (3)
the theory is wrong-headed: it is not organized correctly
and gets the order of explanation wrong. We will look at
these in turn.
As noted in Chapter One, Stalnaker is trying to see
whether Field's theory provides a naturalistic account of
intentionality
, while Field's original intention was to give
a materialistically acceptable account of mental properties.
And, as we noted, intentionality and mentalism diverge.
Thus with respect to the first kind of objection, we need to
keep track separately of whether or not Field has gotten rid
of the mentalism and whether or not he has gotten rid of the
intentionality. The first four sections below speak to the
following: Does Field make it plausible that belief-that
can be given an account without the use of any mentalistic
concepts? Without the use of other intentional concepts? I
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will argue that while many of Stalnaker 's criticisms are
flawed
, Field does not accomplish his purpose.
Stalnaker : Field Doesn't Get the Intentionality Out
Stalnaker speaks in terms of intentionality and does
not mention mentalistic concepts per se . He notes two
places at which apparently intentional notions appear in the
theory. The first is the notion of obvious consequence used
in defining belief*. The second is the causal theory of
reference, which uses the notion of speakers' intentions. A
third place, which Stalnaker does not note, is the
requirement that people only believe* sentences they
understand
.
Stalnaker describes his conception of Field's project
like this:
The first two moves in Field's project are
successive attempts to relocate the problem of
intentionality in narrower and more tractable
places. The analysis of belief into the belief*
relation and the meaning relation shifts the
locus of representation from mental states to
linguistic objects? then the Tarskian truth
characterization tries to shift the locus of
semantic representation from sentences in general
to simple descriptive expressions. ([1984], p.33)
He thinks that Field fails to accomplish this project and in
fact leaves some intentionality in the first half of the
analysis, instead of expunging it completely.
Let's begin with the notion of obvious consequence.
Stalnaker's criticism here is mentioned briefly in passing
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and not developed. He merely notes that the notion of
obvious consequence is apparently a semantical notion and
would have to be spelled out independently of the meanings
of the sentences if Field is to accomplish his project. He
suggests this cannot be done. (See [1984], Ch . 2, fn . 4,
p . 1 7 2
. ) He seems to be focussing on the notion of
consequence. He does not explicitly comment on the notion
of obviousness, which would seem to be a mental relation,
maybe an intentional one, and which deserves scrutiny also.
Before examining Stalnaker's objection and entertaining
possible replies for Field, we need to sort through the
different ways in which Field's definition can be understood
and choose one to work with. Field's definition of belief*,
restricted to human belief, looks like this:
X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or S is
an obvious consequence of sentences X explicitly
stores
.
(Cf. [ 1978] ,p. 84
. ) The same phrase that we will shortly be
examining on suspicion of harboring mentalism or
intentionality
,
namely 'is an obvious consequence of', is
one source of ambiguity because it is not clear how to
understand its logical form. One wants to know, obvious to
whom? Obvious to X, i.e., to the subject of attribution?
Obvious to us who attribute? Obvious perhaps to some
counterfactual person epitomizing ordinary rational powers?
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(Field actually gets this part of his theory from
Dennett
, except for the notion of obviousness, which Dennett
does not use (cf. [Dennett, 1975]). But Dennett speaks of a
device he calls an
’ extrapolator/inducer
’ in the mind of the
agent, and perhaps 'obvious to the subject of attribution’
is the best bet exegetically speaking. Dennett merely
discusses the theory and its problems without either
endorsing or rejecting it outright in this article.)
A second question is how to understand the (intended)
logical form of 'is an obvious consequence'. This does not
mean 'is obvious and a consequence'; rather, 'obvious' seems
to be an operator taking more of the sentence in its scope.
But renderings of Field's account that use 'it is obvious
that run into trouble, as we will see below.
A third problem is 'is'. Field is hoping to capture a
dispositional notion with his definition: one can be said to
believe* things one has never explicitly considered because
one is disposed in a certain way to 'explicitly store' them.
But 'is' does not do the trick, as we will see, and 'would'
has to be introduced, leading to more problems.
Let us look at these three problems in turn, starting
with obviousness-to—whom. The idea that the person to whom
the consequences are obvious will be someone other than the
subject of attribution has its attractions. There are some
things about belief attribution that are or can be oriented
to the attributer rather than the attributee, and if we have
such a thing in the 'obvious' above, then Field has at least
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a partial reply to any threat that obviousness is an
intentional or mental notion: he can claim to have made
progress in that he has said what it is for someone to
believe* a sentence and has done so without utilizing any
further intentional states of the subject of attribution .
(This reply would further require either that we suppose
that Mentalese is common to both us and our subject of
attribution or that we revise the proposal using the notion
of translation. We'll assume that Mentalese is common: it's
simpler and nothing in our dicussion hinges on it.)
But construing obviousness as obviousness-to-us will
not work. Field's proposal suitably revised is
X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or
there are sentences X explicitly stores such that
it is (or would be) obvious-to-us that S follows from
those sentences.
Different things are obvious to different people. Suppose
we say Jones believes that no one would survive a nuclear
war' and do so on the grounds that a sentence meaning 'no
one would survive a nuclear war' follows obviously (to us)
from sentences Jones believes*. It is still possible for
Jones not to believe* any sentence meaning 'no one would
survive a nuclear war', even if he is reminded of the
relevant sentences he explicitly stores. If the above
version of Field's proposal is correct, we would not revise
our claim about Jones's belief in the following situation:
86
Jones has been reminded of relevant sentences he explicitly
stores, he is queried whether anyone would survive a nuclear
war, and he replies 'I have no opinion about that’. But in
fact we would revise our claim.
Since considerations similar to the ones just listed
tell against the idea that obviousness is obviousness to an
idealized observer, I conclude that the obviousness involved
must be obviousness for the person who has the belief. But
now let us see what happens when we make this explicit in
the definition and use the operator 'it is obvious to X
that 1 :
(Dl) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or (i) there
are sentences Sl...Sn that X explicitly stores and (ii) it
is obvious to X that S is a consequence of Sl...Sn.
(Field may mean to include both inductive and deductive
consequences in his notion of consequence. We will just
study deductive consequences, as that is what Stalnaker's
criticism seems directed at.) There are a number of
problems with (Dl). X may never have considered S. Also,
if X is not 'on to' the concept of consequence (and maybe
even if he is), it is not going to be obvious to him that S
is a consequence of Sl...Sn . It may be that if suitably
stimulated, he would perform the deduction (more or less)
immediately, but performing a deduction and recognizing one
for what it is are different things. The former notion
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would seem to be the relevant one: people who do not grasp
the notion of consequence nevertheless have beliefs. (And
remember that Field's original, broader, proposal applied to
animals as well as people.) Here is an attempt to fix both
problems
:
(D2) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or for some
Sl.'.Sn that X explicitly stores, X would deduce S (more or
less) immediately from Sl...Sn if X were to consider S.
Problems: This suffers from the standard defect of
counterfactual definitions. Who knows what would happen if
X considered S ? Maybe the world would blow up before he
had a chance to adopt other attitudes towards it. Or maybe
X just would not happen to perform the deduction — inference
may not be automatic even under the best of circumstances.
A second problem, discussed below, is whether deduction is
merely a mental act, and whether if it is, more mentalism or
intentionality is hiding under its cover.
Let's look at the first problem for a minute. Now, the
notion Field is trying to capture is a dispositional one (he
says), so it is not inappropriate to involve a
counterfactual ; one just needs to be more selective about
the conditions under which X is supposed counterfactually to
be considering S. Would something like the following do the
trick?
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( D3 ) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or for some
sentences Sl...Sn that X explicitly stores, if X considered
S for certain epistemic ends and in a situation where it was
possible to accomplish those ends, X would deduce S (more or
less) immediately from Sl...Sn.
Here, we suppose the subject is motivated in a certain way
as an attempt to rule out certain classes of counterfactual
situations, such as cases of random spinning of fancies,
which are a problem for (D2). But (D3) has problems too:
The problems induced by the presence of the counterfactual
are not completely cleaned up, but more importantly, if we
take this sort of approach to cleaning them up, a host of
new mental and intentional notions will start sneaking into
the definition, those involved in the notions of ends, the
accomplishment of ends, and rationality in general. Again,
this does not seem to be in the spirit of Field. (Stalnaker
attempts to prevent intentionality sneaking into his own
account by this route when he invokes the notion of
optimality, as we will see in Chapter Five, but this has
problems of its own.)
A better version of Field's proposal, I believe, is
this
:
(D4) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or there are
sentences Sl...Sn that X explicitly stores such that if X
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were to have deduced S from Sl...Sn, the deduction would
have been (more or less) immediate.
(I use ’were to have' and ’would have' to limit
counterfactual consideration to worlds where the deduction
actually gets performed and to prevent certain kinds of
problems arising from the fact that what counts as an
obvious deduction can change for a person over time. The
whole thing can be relativized to times explicitly, but it
is easier just to agree to take the tenses seriously in any
application of the definition.)
Now, must the deduction performed be correct? It seems
that neither Field nor Stalnaker, especially Stalnaker,
would want to have just any old drawing of a conclusion
count as a deduction: the deducer must get it right. They
do not say why they think this, but let us follow their
lead, reserving criticism for later. Thus we have the final
version of Field's definition, the one we will be working
with
:
(D5) X believes* S iff X explicitly stores S or there are
sentences Sl...Sn which X explicitly stores such that (i) S
follows from Sl...Sn, and (ii) if X were to have deduced S
from Sl...Sn, the deduction would have had few steps or one
step.
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I believe that this is the best we can do for Field. The
reader may see ways to object to the left-to-right half of
the definition (based on the role belief* is supposed to
Play in construing belief). They could be ruled out by
further fussing, although we might be forced to invoke some
kind of intentionality or mentalism. We will not pursue
this degree of refinement unless it turns out there is
nothing more serious to criticize in the cruder definition,
which it won't.
Some final comments: although we are going along with
the idea that the performance of the deduction must be the
performance of a genuine deduction because Field and
Stalnaker presuppose it, this idea seems dubious. The
notion of belief being carved out is too much a notion of
rational belief (irrational belief is belief too). And to
capture a broader notion of belief, the whole approach would
have to be changed: the work that the notion 'correct
performance of deduction' does cannot be done by a notion
such as 'taking the next step in a train of thought'.
Furthermore, even if we do want to limit ourselves to
rational belief, it is very unclear how one would make a
parallel claim for the inductive drawing of conclusions.
One problem is the notion of obviousness: for deduction, we
can talk about number of steps. Not in any clear way can we
do this for induction. What would correspond to the clause
'the deduction would have had few steps or one step'? 'The
induction would have been strong and been recognized to be
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so'? We don't have a syntactic model to appeal to, the way
we do for deduction.
The Notion of Obvious Consequence
Stalnaker thinks the notion of obvious consequence
sneaks intentionality into Field’s proposal, and we are also
asking whether it sneaks any mentalistic concepts in. Given
the version of Field’s proposal we arrived at, the notion of
obviousness is not going to be the source of the problem, if
there is one.
Obviousness for consequence is, given what we have said
above, most reasonably cashed out in terms of something like
immediacy-or-shortness of deduction, which in turn is cashed
out in terms of performing a deduction (however that is
done) in few steps or one step. The notion of number of
steps seems fairly non-intentional
,
and it apparently is not
mentalistic, either.
Now that we have ramified the conception of deduction
though, we have to consider the notion of performance of
deduction. Is it intentional or mentalistic? This depends
on whether performance needs to be deliberate or whether an
unintentional performance would count. Clearly the
performance does not have to be consciously deliberate. But
a more subtle kind of deliberateness may be involved. The
whole picture may not make sense unless we suppose the
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deducer to have certain background goals as part of her
mental equipage and the deductions to have something to do
with these. It is this problem I tried on Field's behalf to
rule out in the switch from (D3) to (D4), and it seems to be
coming back in. There, in order to get away from epistemic
goals, we confined our attention to the closest worlds in
which the deductions turn out to be performed. If the
performance of a deduction is construed as certain brain
processes, then surely such brain processes could arise
randomly or be generated by a scientist sticking probes in
people s brains. Thus we may find ourselves saying that
both (a) Jones believes so-and-so in virtue of the fact that
some deduction would happen and (b) it would happen in a way
that is completely divorced from Jones's understanding,
interests, goals, and abilities. These latter notions can't
be added in to solve the problem, though, since they are
mental and intentional.
A dialectically possible move for Field is just to put
his foot down, say the picture does make sense, and
challenge his critics to come up with an actual
counterexample to his account of belief (i.e., one based on
this alleged problem). I doubt any would be forthcoming. A
fancier version of this move is the following. Earlier, we
were talking about taking the indicative seriously. Perhaps
Field can insist on our taking the subjunctive conditional
seriously. Since Field is not trying for an analysis, but
only an account, he can insist on our taking seriously the
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relativity of the counterfactual to the actual world. This,
however, would severely limit the possible generality of his
proposal, and although he does not say how general he wants
it to be, perhaps he wants more than this.
Despite the ways out available to Field, there is a
problem here, one which has its source not so much in the
language
-of-thought approach as in the fact that Field is
treating belief both as more basic and as more isolated from
the notions of intentions and goals than it really is. In
order to do Field’s project right, one would need to develop
a typology of mental intentional relations and then start at
the bottom, examining the intentionality of the most basic
ones. Belief is not all that basic. Representation of
objects is more basic, as are entertainment and acceptance.
Also, assumption seems to be parallel and neither more nor
less basic, suggesting that a typology will be complicated.
(As Meinong pointed out, assumption is not temporary belief
because one can assume a thing while never ceasing to
believe its contrary.)
Now let us consider the notion of consequence, which is
what Stalnaker has in his sights. What he seems to be
suggesting is that the relevant notion of consequence is
semantic consequence, and that this is a problem for Field
because semantic consequence is an intentional relation.
Stalnaker has been misled by his own description of
Field's project. He spoke of 'relocating the problem of
intentionality in narrower and more tractable places’. He
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is distressed to find that after belief has been separated
into belief* and meaning, there is still semantic
intent ionality to be found in belief*. But on a correct
conception of what Field is proposing, the ‘narrower place'
into which the problem of intentionality has been pushed
just is the realm of semantic intentionality. If someone
told Field that he had rid his initial proposal about belief
of all intentional concepts except semantically intentional
ones, he would be pleased rather than disturbed: his project
is to boil the problem of intentionality down to the problem
of semantic intentionality and then to bring in Tarski.
(Granted, it is not clear how Field proposes to get from
Tarski to semantic consequence.) Merely the fact that the
notion of consequence involved is semantic, if it is a fact,
is not enough to do Field in.
Actually, it is not at all clear what notion of
consequence is intended. Field does not say, and in
Dennett's original article, deduction has a syntactic
flavor. But suppose semantic consequence is what Field
wants . The two main varieties of semantic consequence
available are the model-theoretic one and the world-
theoretic one. Since we have ramified the notion of
deduction, neither of these will present any special problem
for Field: the deducer does not have to recognize the
consequence for what it is by sorting through different
worlds or different interpretations of non-logical
vocabulary: she just has to get an answer somehow in few or
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one steps
, and the answer has to follow from sentences she
explicitly stores, world-theoretically or model-
theoretically
, as the case may be. We have seen there are
problems with Field's conception of belief*, and one thinks
of them again here, but no new problems are introduced by
consequence being semantic, if it is.
The Notion of Understanding a Sentence
Field does not say why he requires that the sentence
that is the object of belief* be understood. One obvious
problem that this constraint rules out, probably the one
Field has in mind, is that someone might happen to store a
sentence of an unknown language, a sentence which says
something he does not believe. (Dennett mentions this
problem.) The problem at least partly arises from Field's
conception of (certain) beliefs as stored sentences, which
is rather a bizarre notion to begin with. Given we are
going to indulge in metaphor, why not set things up so that
storage is memory? Precisely what Field needs to solve the
problem of the unknown sentence is a way of drawing the
distinction between remembering a sentence and believing it.
In Field's account of belief, storage is something of a
dummy notion or place-holder, but it is supposed to have a
materialistic flavor - the idea of storage of sentences is
supposed to sound reassuringly physical, even mechanistic.
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(What Field needs to do, in my opinion, is to let storage be
memory and find another dummy notion for construing belief.)
But supposing that Field wants to maintain his picture of
belief based on the storage of sentences, what can he say?
There are two questions: must Field invoke the notion of
understanding a sentence to get out of the problem of the
unknown sentence, and, if he must, how badly off, how deeply
mental or intensional, is this notion?
Now, the relevant conception of understanding a
sentence is understanding the meaning of a sentence, so both
the notion of understanding and the notion of meaning seem
to be involved. For Field, meaning is an intentional
notion, but one he thinks he has no reason to fear -
presumably, this new appearance of the notion of meaning is
ultimately done away with in favor of truth conditions.
According to the tradition Field is drawing on,
understanding a sentence is knowing its truth conditions.
Must Field invoke the notion of knowing the truth
conditions of the sentences of Mentalese to get out of the
problem of the unknown sentence? And is the notion of
understanding a sentence, i.e., knowing its truth
conditions, irretrievably mental or intentional? No and
probably not
.
Here is something that can be said to stave off the
problem at least temporarily. The problem of the unknown
sentence is not at this stage a genuine philosophical
problem, and it should not be treated as if it had that
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status. It is only a question - a question engendered by
the storage metaphor. It does show the proposal is unclear;
it does not show that a believer must in addition to storing
a sentence understand it. The user of the metaphor can
easily block the alleged problem with more metaphor: maybe
the storage bin is constructed so that it will only accept
sentences of Mentalese.
And should we need to invoke the notion of
understanding a sentence, i.e., of knowing its truth
conditions, or simply be interested in it, it is probably
not in principle any worse off than belief itself, allowing
for the fact that its explication in naturalistic terms is
more complex. Probably Field would postulate a notion of
knowledge*, just as he did a notion of belief*.
One thing that is very unclear about Field's theory is
the relation between a propositional attitude and its
internal 'asterisk' counterpart when the propositional
attitude is not basic. (Field acts as if he supposes belief
is fairly basic.) Knowledge is non-defectively justified
true belief. Is there such a thing as knowledge* ? In what
does it consist ? Would the following two principles be
equivalent, or would they give us something to choose
between ?:
X knows that p iff for some S, X knows* S
and S means that p
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X knows that p iff for some S, X believes* S,
S is true, S is non-
defectively justified* for X,
and S means that p
Again, Field needs a typology 1 But I see no reason in
principle why there could not be one and why the different
attitudes
-belief, knowledge, etc.- could not all be
construed as attitudes toward sentences.
This is not to say that a Fieldian view about knowledge
of truth conditions would not be open to other known
problems. A standard problem for the language-of-thought
approach has always been the status of Mentalese: does it
have meaning, does the thinker understand its meaning, and
if so, in what language does this understanding take place?
Field discusses this problem (in a slightly different
connection) and replies to it. He quotes Harman's statement
of the problem, originally aimed at Davidson. (This is
Harman speaking):
Davidson would (presumably) say that the speaker
understands [the sentence 'Snow is white']
by virtue of the fact that he knows it
is true if and only if snow is white. The dif-
ficulty... is that [for the speaker to know
any such thing he] needs some way to represent
to himself snow's being white. If the
relevant speaker uses the words 'snow is
white ' to represent in the relevant way that
snow is white ,... Davidson ' s [theory] would
be circular. And, if speakers have available
a form of Mentalese in which they can represent
that snow is white, so that the [theory avoids]
circularity, there is still the problem of
meaning for Mentalese.
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(Quoted in [1978], p.101. Bracketed interpolations are
Field's.) What Field says in reply is that the semantics of
a system of internal representation must ascribe truth
conditions, not knowledge of truth conditions to the
sentences of Mentalese ([1978], p.101). I guess the idea is
that we should substitute the notion of having truth
conditions for the notion of understanding truth conditions
when it comes to Mentalese. But what could the force of
this possibly be ? We already believed that Mentalese would
have truth conditions; that's part of what is supposed in
the idea that Mentalese is a language.
Let s transmogrify the objection and the reply into a
form directly relevant to the present discussion. Suppose
that for me, Mentalese is French. Let's say that I believe
that snow is white in virtue of storing the sentence 'La
neige est blanche'. Now Field holds that I not only store
this sentence, I understand it, i.e., I know what its truth
conditions are. And presumably for Field knowledge is to be
defined by appeal to knowledge*, like this:
X knows that p iff for some S, X knows* S and
S means that p.
An instance of this definition that captured my knowledge of
the truth conditions of 'La neige est blanche' (which we
will abbreviate 'N') would look like this:
C.G. knows that: N is true iff snow is white
IFF
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for some S, C.G. knows* S, and S means
that: N is true iff snow is white.
Let's agree to call the relevant sentence I know* (we assume
there’s just one), 'S*'. According to Field's theory, I
understand S*. Perhaps S* is
neige est blanche' est vraie iff
la neige est blanche.
Again, I would have to understand S*, and understanding S*
would be a matter of knowing its truth conditions. A
certain kind of infinite regress is generated: we never
reach a stopping point from which we can explain in what
understanding a given sentence consists.
If we just mechanically transmogrify Field's reply to
Harman for the present context, we get: the semantics for
Internal French must ascribe truth conditions, not knowledge
of truth conditions to the sentences of Internal French.
Well, the semantics for Internal French do just ascribe
truth conditions, and the regress would still be there. It
seems to me that what Field must do here is either drop the
idea that the sentences of internal language are understood,
ruling out the problem of the unknown sentence in some other
way as suggested above, or say that one can understand
sentences of internal language in other ways than by
explicitly knowing their truth conditions.
The Notion o f Intention and the Causal Theory
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Stalnaker accuses Field of hiding intentionality in the
causal theory of reference. According to the the causal
theory, when a name is passed on from person to person in
such a way as to constitute a chain of reference, the person
hearing the name for the first time intends to use it with
the same reference that the person from whom he heard it
does (cf. [Kripke, 1972], p. 96). The concept of an
intention is both mentalistic and intentional: if it is
instantiated a thinker exists, and intentions are about
things
.
The causal theory actually seems to get invoked twice
in Field s theory, once for external language, and once for
internal language (1). It seems only to be explicitly
invoked in connection with external language, though Field
is very unclear about this. The schema with which it all
began is
A person X believes that p iff for some S,
X believes* S and S means that p.
The 'p' is schematic, or seems to be. But then Field
suggests that meaning is to be explicated in terms of truth
at a world, and he gives his base clause for a truth
characterization
:
' Pb ' is true at w iff there is an object x that
b denotes (in the actual world) and a property Z
that P stands for (in the actual world), and w is
a world in which x exists and has Z ([1978], p.86)
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In an instantiation, the Quine corners would become
quotation marks. It is unclear how these two definitions
are supposed to fit together. With respect to external
language, what kind of principles would legitimate
inferences involving both the schematic 'p' and quotation
marks? (I don't say there aren't any.) With respect to
internal language, how can we quote it? Field does not
contemplate how explicitly to combine the two. Here is one
suggestion that perhaps captures what Field has in mind ('p'
is schematic and is in Quine corners at its appearance on
the righthand side of the biconditional, but not the left):
A person X believes that p iff X believes* some
sentence S and S means the set of worlds at
which 'p' is true.
This seems to be in the spirit of Field, and we will adopt
it as our working hypothesis about what he meant.
Now, here is an instance of this principle, articulated
so as to emphasize the place at which the causal theory of
reference for external language comes forward:
(A) Jones believes that Poppy is a spy iff for some S Jones
believes* S and S picks out the set of worlds wherein that
which 'Poppy' actually denotes is in the extension of that
which 'spy' actually stands for.
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It seems to be assumed that Mentalese is a denotational
language, and so there is an implicit idea that if Jones has
a belief about some thing, then there is a mental vocabulary
item in Jones's internal language that denotes that thing.
Here is another consequence of Field's theory with external
denotation suppressed and internal denotation brought
forward
:
(B) If Jones believes that Poppy is a spy then for some S,
Jones believes* S, and S contains a denotational expression
partly in virtue of which S means that Poppy is a spy.
Whichever kind of denotation Stalnaker is worrying about,
Field has a reply that will save the language—of—thought
approach, though there will be some cost. With respect to
the denotation done by bits of internal language, even if we
suppose there to be some kind of causal relation present, we
certainly would not want to say that intending to use names
as others do is involved, or that any overt intentions at
all are. The causal theory of reference belongs to a
tradition that seeks to solve certain puzzles about external
language, and it is part of Kripke's solutions that the
links in the chain be held together by intentions. But the
same problems do not exist for denotation by internal
language, and similar intentions will thus not be invoked
and are not a problem. Field is not threatened, except by
the criticism that he has not been very forthcoming about
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denotation for internal language (a criticism we will
discuss below). Anyway, he is not threatened by any extra
intent ionality from 'intends'.
As for the other place at which denotation enters the
theory (see (A) above), this does not threaten Field,
either. Field's available reply is that the mental attitude
invoked, that of intention, is not an attitude of Jones; he
also can say (following a suggestion in [Kaplan 1989]) that
the concept of intention is not part of the meaning or
analysis of 'denotes'. In (A), the content of the belief is
described in a way that is oriented to the audience of the
claim
-us- rather than to any object of the claim
-e.g.
Jones. On this view, Jones may represent Poppy with
something very unlike the name 'Poppy', both internally and
externally. And part of what makes the equivalence correct,
if it is, is our linguistic practices (yours and mine, dear
reader), not Jones's.
Perhaps the conditions for Jones's belief cannot be
assertively stated
,
given Field's approach, without
implicating the existence of the intentions of the stater
(and various attitudes of the audience as well). But that
is not a problem for Field. If our intentions are not
entailed, what Field can say is that Stalnaker has confused
a feature of what it takes to assert the account with a
feature of the account itself.
Conclusion: In a sense, we have uncovered some
intentionality in the theory, but it is not where Stalnaker
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said it would be. It lies in
-it is- the notion of
denotation for Mentalese, about which Field is so unduly
reticent. One cannot exactly accuse Field of having missed
it
' since his theory is set up around it, but one can say
that he will not be judged to have succeeded in his project
until he explains this central notion.
Preliminary Conclusions
We have now examined all the places in Field's theory
that Stalnaker singled out where mentalism and
intentionality threatened to creep in (and more). What
conclusions can we draw ?
Stalnaker 's criticisms do not convince. Field has
replies to charges that mental ism is hidden in the notions
of obvious consequence and the causal theory of reference.
It's true that there is more intentionality in the theory
than Field is very explicit about, but as long as he sticks
to his guns, i.e., to truth theory plus denotation, for
construing mental linguistic intentionality, Stalnaker 's
comments do not threaten him. We have also seen that there
is a reply to be made to the idea that the requirement that
one understand one's internal sentences sneaks in
unaccounted-for intentionality, although that notion may be
problematic in other ways. The only serious threat of
intentionality or mentalism comes in the notion of
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background goals or of rationality of belief, which
Stalnaker does not mention.
In a sense, Field’s available replies are too easy,
though. Whenever someone points out a semantically
intentional notion sneaking in. Field can say, ’Semantic
intentlonality does not bother me'. For a mentally
intentional notion, typically an attitude, Field can say,
'Oh, that’s an attitude toward a sentence. Each attitude is
a different way of treating mental sentences'. This is not
going to be convincing until Field develops a typology of
mental relations and explains what the different treatments
are. When we discussed knowledge and knowledge*, we saw
what kinds of questions can arise, and although belief is
less complicated than knowledge, it is not basic, either.
Another problem for Field is that his account of belief
is too much an account of rational belief. The approach
Field is taking, which makes belief a dispositional notion,
requires maintaining some kind of limitations on the
counter factual situations in which one might come to have a
belief, and Field does it with the notion of (obvious)
consequence, which we are construing as (short) deduction.
But there does not seem to be any natural generalization
that would cover irrational belief. If deduction goes out
the window, what will limit the counterfactual situations?
Field meant to establish the bona fides of the
language-of-thought approach with his account of belief.
Although Stalnaker has not shown that his approach is not
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viable. Field has not done this. Probably he chose the
wrong mental concept to work on. Belief is a more
complicated and less basic mental relation than one might
think, and understanding it in terms of 'storage' of
sentences is too simplistic.
Let us consider briefly the notion of having-a-memory-
that. Now, understanding memory in terms of storage of
sentences is simplistic too, but perhaps it is not overly
simplistic for our purposes. And if Field could give a
'materialistically acceptable account' of memory-that, this
would go just as far toward establishing his approach as
such an account of belief would. Consider
X has a memory that p iff for some S, X stores S
and S means that p.
(Some people object to the phrase 'has a memory that'. It
is okay in my idiolect. The points I want to make can also
be made with respect to 'X has a memory of P's being Q',
though the parallelism is not as direct.) Memory does not
presuppose rationality, if construed broadly enough. It
does not embody a dispositional notion, and it does not
require background goals. This is much less problematic
than Field's proposal and goes just as far towards showing
that mental intentionality can be explained
naturalistically
.
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Stalnaker : Tarskian Truth Doesn't Do What Field Wants
The second set of problems Stalnaker raises for Field
falls under the general heading, Tarskian truth theory does
not meet the demands that Field wants to place on it. Field
wants Tarskian truth theory plus the causal theory of
reference to bear the entire burden of construing the
meaning relation. Stalnaker raises two problems. The first
is that Field is wrong to think that Tarski succeeded in
reducing truth to primitive denotation. Stalnaker says he
has been convinced by Field's valence analogy that "a
definition of primitive denotation by enumeration makes no
contribution to a naturalistic explanation of
intentionality " . But he sees another application for the
analogy: He asks whether the recursive rules of a Tarskian
truth characterization are any better off than the
specification of denotation. "I don't think so," he says,
"for they are essentially just definitions by enumeration
too, for various classes of complex expressions" ([1984],
p.30). Just as the listlike specification of the denotation
function did not give the physical basis for denotation, so
these recursive rules
establish an extensional equivalence between
ascriptions of truth to sentences and
ascriptions of primitive denotation to the
ultimate constituents of sentences, but... do
not tell us any more about the basis for
those ascriptions than does a definition of
primitive denotation by enumeration.
([1984], p.30)
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Stalnaker
' s second criticism is related to this one. He
thinks it is conceivable that at some point in the recursion
the physicalistic basis for meaning might suddenly be
different. He uses the analogy of valence again, noting
that not only do elements have valences, but so do certain
stable configurations of elements, radicals. He says
It is conceivable that the physical explanation
of whY elements combine together in the way
predicted by valence theory be quite different
from the physical explanation of why radicals
combine together, and with elements, in the way
predicted by the valence theory. ([ 1984 ], p. 31 )
As for radicals, so, possibly, for some of the larger
expressions of a language.
This discussion drifts pretty far from Tarski. For the
sake of accuracy, let's note the following. Tarski did not
think that truth reduced to primitive denotation alone, even
for denotational languages. He thought that truth reduced
to purely logical notions. Also, the ultimate step in
reduction involves satisfaction, not denotation per se
.
Also, denotation for predicates, which Stalnaker and Field
are presupposing, is a nouveau addition.
But in the interest of having the issue joined, let us
think in Fieldian terms as Stalnaker is, adopt the idea that
predicates denote, and simply forget about reduction. Let's
just take Stalnaker 's two objections to point to the same
gap in Field's theory and to combine to make an objection
that says that Field has considered the physicalistic basis
only for part of the truth-theoretic recursion.
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One minimal but in my opinion dialectically adequate
response is to say that the burden of proof is on Stalnaker
here. Sure, some new kind of physical basis might pop up
farther out in the recursion, but why should we suppose it
will ? Stalnaker has said nothing to make this plausible.
He could have though, so let me say it, and then we will see
if any reply is available for Field.
It is implausible to think that the parts of the
recursion concerned solely with assigning truth values on
the basis of truth values already assigned are going to have
a physical basis in which something new pops up at some
point far out in the recursion. This leaves only a few
kinds of places where a new element can creep in: the atomic
clause and the quantifier clause, or those clauses as they
combine with others. The atomic clause in a typical truth
characterization goes as follows (Field's has extra
complications not relevant here):
Pb is true iff the object 'b 1 denotes is a member
of the set ' P' denotes.
The function of this clause in a truth characterization is
to make explicit the semantic effect of a certain syntactic
operation we will call 'syntactic predication'. It is not
the case that syntactic predication denotes anything (it is
not a symbol, but a property of symbols). But it is
correlated, by this clause, with set membership, without
denoting set membership.
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Well, seemingly, here is one place for something new to
creep into the physicalistic basis for meaning. Field has
said nothing about a physicalistic basis for the
coordination of syntactic predication and set membership,
and this is something one could ask about: in virtue of what
physical properties or events is syntactic predication
coordinated with set membership?
The only way out I can see for Field here is to adopt
our 'structuralist' interpretation of Tarski, at least for
the recursive clauses of the truth definition, if not for
primitive denotation. The notion of structure, obscure
though it may be, contains nothing that need alarm the
physicalist. It is uncontroversial that the physical world
has structure and it is uncontroversial that structure has
something to do with meaning.
What Field can say with respect to syntactic
predication is that the criticism is misplaced. All it
takes to give the 'physical basis' which 'constitutes' the
fact that the sentence 'Socrates is wise' means that
Socrates is wise is to observe that the following set of
facts is part of a certain homomorphism we know as
(interpreted) English: 'Socrates' causal-theoretically
denotes Socrates, 'wise' stands for/denotes wisdom, the
sentence 'Socrates is wise' has the structure of a syntactic
predication, syntactic predication and set membership have a
parallel structure, and in any world where Socrates is wise,
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parallel instances of syntactic predication and set
membership are realized.
Field can say that what we do know about the recursion
-that the basic vocabulary denotes, and that similarity of
structure between syntax and semantics is maintained no
matter how far out you go in the recursion- is enough to
explain the physicalistic basis for meaning completely. A
similar story could perhaps be told about quantification,
though this is too complicated an issue to be taken up here.
Stalnaker : Field's Approach Is Misguided
The third type of criticism that Stalnaker directs
against Field is metatheoretic criticism: he thinks the way
Field goes about constructing his theory is wrong-headed and
gets the explanatory relations wrong. The theory is
'atomistic' (that's bad), and it ignores the fact that "it
is conceivable that beings might inquire, deliberate,
calculate and speculate without being able to share the
fruits of their thought with fellow beings" ([1984], p.41).
Let's look at these two points in turn.
By saying of a theory that it is atomistic, Stalnaker
means "it holds that the most basic kind of representation
relation -the kind from which all other representational
relations derive- is a relation between linguistic
atoms ... and elements of the world" ([1984], p.34).
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Stalnaker is thinking of a view that Dummett expounds in
—-
ge:
—
llosoPhy of Language and elsewhere. Roughly the
view is that one cannot explain how language works without
explaining the things it is used for. The form a theory of
semantic meaning takes is constrained by the fact that it
must fit into a larger theory of the things one can do with
language: the 'moves' (assertions, commands, questions) one
can make in a language game. An atomistic approach
precludes this. Dummett does not define atomism (anywhere I
can find), but it is plain that he would consider Tarski's
theory (as we have interpreted it) atomistic: denotation
functions are specified without invoking the role denotation
plays in making assertions, giving commands, and so forth.
Denotation is specified in a vacuum, as it were.
Stalnaker 's point goes by very quickly, but I think
what he means to say is that a proper general linguistic
theory is organized as Dummett describes and that Field's
atomistic approach precludes his views being part of such a
theory.
Once again it is unclear whether this application of
Dummett ' s ideas is supposed to constutute an objection to
Field's theory of meaning for external language or internal
langugage. It is not clear that external denotation-by-
causal-chain should be declared atomistic: intending to use
expressions as others do may involve having intentions about
what moves one would make in language games using them.
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And even Tarskian denotation can perhaps meet Dummett's
demand. It is not irrelevant to what we can do with
sentences in language games that denotation is a function .
In order to assert something about someone, for example, we
must determine him or pick him out for our audience:
functionality is relevant to making moves in language games.
A 'move' such as making an assertion may be composed of
other moves, such as 'picking out' and 'saying of'.
With respect to internal language, Field can say that
even if this picture of how external language is to be
understood is correct, Stalnaker needs to show that it
applies to Mentalese. In no obvious sense does one 'make
moves in a language game' in Mentalese.
Perhaps there is an unobvious sense, though. There is
an intuitive correspondence between certain mental acts and
certain speech acts. Occurrent belief corresponds to
assertion; wondering corresponds to interrogation; intending
someone to do something corresponds to the imperative; and
an attitude somewhere between entertaining and assuming
corresponds to certain uses of clauses. Maybe we could
think of occurrent belief, wondering, etc., as moves in the
mental language game.
(These ideas are based on those of Meinong in On
Assumption
,
although he would not agree with everything I
have said. Meinong had an interesting theory of semantic
and pragmatic meaning according to which an assertion
pragmatically expresses the presence of an occurrent belief
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(or judgment'), an uninflected clause pragmatically
expresses the presence of a certain attitude that lies
between entertaining and assuming, (which Meinong called
assumption'), etc. In addition, Meinong had something
Field needs and lacks, a typology of mental relations.)
The Stalnaker-Dummett objection transmogrified would
be: Field's theory doesn't take account of the role the
internal sentences play in mental acts such as belief,
assumption, intending, wondering, etc. But that is of
course exactly what Field is trying to take account of.
Presumably, the claim would be that an atomistic theory of
denotation for Mentalese would prevent his theory from
9 etting off the ground. But atomistic meaning seems to be
irrelevant here. In the tradition in which Field is
working, the roles of the internal sentences are construed
mechanically, in terms of storage of sentences, detachment
of consequents, and such things.
Is It Possible to Think Without Language?
The second of the two metatheoretical criticisms was
that it was conceivable that there be thoughts that cannot
be expressed in language. This criticism occurs in a
context where the 'big pictures' -the pragmatic picture and
the linguistic picture- are being contrasted, to the
disadvantage of the linguistic picture, and is not
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specifically aimed at Field, although Field is taken to be
the main representative of the linguistic picture. Aimed at
Field's particular theory in the present dialectical
context, the point seems a weak one. Stalnaker's words need
to be interpreted as making a very strong claim about the
nature of thought that goes like this: thought is such that
it is possible for there to be thoughts that cannot even in
principle be expressed linguistically. Presumably if
thought were (like) the utilization of language, this claim
would be untrue. Stalnaker does not offer any basis for his
claim - presumably it is supposed to have the status of an
intuition. But are intuitions about what is and is not
possible of any use here? Are there even any clear
intuitions? If there is a language of thought, and if
thinking is utilizing it in various ways, the utilization
does not happen at a conscious level, so certainly
phenomenological intuitions are of no use. Is the intuition
supposed to be a logical intuition about the relationship
between these two concepts: thought and linguistic
expression?
Other Criticisms
Further study of Field's proposal yields several more
problems. Field is very cavalier about postulating a
language of thought without telling us anything about what
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it is like or whether experiencing the use of such a
language is part of the phenomenology of mental experience.
He also does not discuss the issue of types versus tokens of
mental language, and the problem of whether there is a
common mental language, how we could know if there was, and
what true* means as applied to private experience.
Consideration of these and related issues leads to more
criticisms
.
The Problem of Different Types of Representation
Does pictorial thinking, aural thinking, geometrical
and topological intuition, and so forth, count as
utilization of the language of thought? If so, the
language (s) of thought would seem to be rather different
than external language. If not, we must suppose some common
background language which does ... -what ? Translates
pictorial (e.g.) representations? Describes the
representations? Records their content (whatever 'their
content' might be)?
Each of the two alternatives leads to trouble. Using
pictorial mental representations as a paradigm, let's
consider the first alternative: pictorial representations
(such as one receives as a result of the use of the eyes)
comprise one of the languages of thought. I f we believe
something, according to Field, then there is some sentence
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in our language of thought that means that thing. What on
earth would count as a sentence, given that sentences
include these pictures? Field never says what shall count
as a sentence, and he is relying on our intuitive
understanding of the concept of a sentence, an understanding
derived completely from consideration of sentences of
external language. He may be thinking of pictures, sounds,
etc., as sentence- like . If he means 'there is some thing in
our pictorial system of thought very like an external
sentence...', his claim is unsubstantiated. If, on the
other hand, he means 'there is some thing in our system of
pictorial thought that resembles, but also significantly
differs from an external sentence. . •
' ,
then it is not just a
given that one can invoke the notion of truth.
The second alternative had three folds: either
pictorial representations are translated into Mentalese, or
they are described in Mentalese, or their content is
recorded in Mentalese. The notion of translation, like the
notion of truth, does not seem to apply to pictorial
representations. As for description, obviously not just any
old description of a pictorial representation is suited to
the uses to which we put such representations. A
description that recorded the division of my visual array
into rows and columns of 'pixels' or minimum perceptibles
and the color of each pixel would miss the content of the
picture: We would have
1A pale green/IB pale green/lC medium green... etc.
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instead of
little green men from Mars 1
.
The description would have to capture content. But there
may well be no such thing as ’the' content of a picture.
Some pictures may be so rich that no finite list of
sentences can capture all the content they record. And some
may be too poor to determine content (in the propositional
sense of 'content').
third and last fold is that content is recorded in
Mentalese. But now we have a new kind of intentionality to
deal with: the representational content of a picture. For
the reasons just listed, it is not clear how the
representational content of a picture can be assimilated to
linguistic intentionality as Field's strategy requires.
It was the notions of truth and Tarskian truth
conditions that gave Field's view what power it had to
dissolve the problem of intentionality. The view is in
danger of being uninterestingly trivial if Field is reduced
to saying that belief-that-P is a relation between a person
and a language-like item somehow related to P.
Consonance with the Semantics of 'Believes' Is Lacking
Field is not putting forward his proposal about belief
as an analysis of the concept belief, a rendering of the
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logical form of 'X believes that P', truth conditions for
belief-sentences, or a theory about belief attribution. The
proposal comes in the form of a material biconditional that
is supposed to live up to the following claim: it provides a
materialistically acceptable account" of the mental
relation, belief. Field does not say much more than this.
He seems to want to demand more of his proposal than that it
just record an accidental concomitance, but he does not say
what more.
Despite not knowing exactly what kind of theory Field
is presenting, we can draw certain connections between what
he says and the idea of giving truth conditions for
sentences of the form 'X believes that P'. An instance of
the theory is
Sam believes that Poppy is a spy iff for some S,
Sam believes* S and S is true in all the worlds
where 'Poppy is a spy' is true.
(Here we will only be interested in the reading where
substitutions for 'Poppy' are problematic - the so-called de
dicto reading.) Now, here are some bad consequences for
Field derived from our intuitions about the semantics of
belief. It is easy to show that a consequence of his theory
is that if Sam believes that George is a spy, then Sam
believes that Poppy is a spy, given that George is Poppy.
Let's call this 'the problem of equivalence'.
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Another problem involving belief attribution is
illustrated by the following sentence:
Mary believes that her ugly old flatware is
going to win a prize at the Antiques Show.
This can be said truly when it is the speaker who thinks the
flatware is ugly and Mary thinks it is beautiful, even on
the dj? dicto 1 reading, i.e., on the one we are interested
in. According to Field's view,
Mary believes that her ugly old flatware is going
to win a prize at the Antiques Show
iff
there is some sentence S such that Mary believes*
S and S means that (i.e. is true in exactly the worlds
where) Mary's ugly old flatware is going to win a prize
at the Antiques Show,
which surely is wrong (again, reading the description de
dicto ) . Let's call this 'the problem of point of view'.
We adopted as one of our desiderata that Field's and
Stalnaker's accounts of belief should not jar our
intuitions, shaky though they may be after all these years,
about the semantics of belief. But Field's account does.
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Another problem involving belief attribution is
illustrated by the following sentence:
Mary believes that her ugly old flatware is
going to win a prize at the Antiques Show.
This can be said truly when it is the speaker who thinks the
flatware is ugly and Mary thinks it is beautiful, even on
the de dicto 1 reading, i.e., on the one we are interested
in. According to Field's view.
Mary believes that her ugly old flatware is going
to win a prize at the Antiques Show
iff
there is some sentence S such that Mary believes*
S and S means that (i.e. is true in exactly the worlds
) Mary s ugly old flatware is going to win a prize
at the Antiques Show,
which surely is wrong (again, reading the description de
dicto ) . Let's call this 'the problem of point of view'.
We adopted as one of our desiderata that Field's and
Stalnaker's accounts of belief should not jar our
intuitions, shaky though they may be after all these years,
about the semantics of belief. But Field's account does.
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Conclusions
How does Field's theory stand up to the demands we
listed m Chapter One? Our first question was, can Field
give an account of a mentalistic concept without using other
mental ( istic ) concepts? We saw that belief is problematic,
that it may presuppose some kind of background goals, but
that Field may be able to give an account of memory.
Is there some hope on Field's approach of showing
belief to be continuous with other mental concepts, and not
just propositional ones? It is hard to see how. Field runs
into problems even with pictorial representation: how is the
language
-of-thought approach supposed to stretch to cover
' feels happy '
?
Is the treatment of belief consonant with our
intuitions about the semantics of 'believes'? No.
(Although most our theories about the semantics of
'believes' are not consonant with them, either, so this may
be a bit unfair
.
)
Is the claim of a physicalistic basis for
intentionality made plausible in some way and not just
asserted? No. Even a little bit of a story about how
sentences stored as beliefs and sentences stored as desires
interact with each other that accorded with our intuitions
about how belief and desire work would have gone a long way
toward this, but Field offers nothing. There is also a
gaping hole where there should be an account of denotation
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for Mentalese. If there is an argument for the view, it
goes something like this: Semanticalism and mentalism are
repugnant to the scientific mind and so can't be right. But
Tarski-plus-causal
-theory is the only available coherent
theory about mental and semantic intentionality that does
not invoke semanticalism and mentalism. So our best guess
is that it is the correct theory. But as Stalnaker shows,
and as we will see in the next chapter, there is an
alternative
.
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CHAPTER V
STALNAKER
' S THEORY COMPARED TO FIELD'S
In this chapter I will present Stalnaker's theory of
intent lonality and some criticisms of it that have emerged
in the literature. The chapter is constructed to parallel
Chapter Four, and I will interleave comparisons of Stalnaker
and Field. In the final section, I will summarize the
conclusions of the comparison, which will also be the
conclusions of the dissertation.
Stalnaker's Theory
Stalnaker holds that when we say of something that it
weighs 200 pounds or is six feet tall, we assert a relation
between a physical object and a non-physical one, a number.
This relationship, he thinks, is not problematic for the
physicalist, or ought not be: measurement theory gives us an
explication of the relationship. The family of properties
which are weights of physical objects have a structure in
common with the real numbers, and in virtue of this, we can
(given a standard unit) use different numbers to pick out
different ones of these properties: given the unit pound ,
the number 10 picks out a certain property that some
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relatively small objects share, and the number 200 picks out
a property that some rather larger objects share.
Stalnaker takes this as a model for explicating certain
relationships between people and propositions, which are
also abstract. He sees an intuitive analogy between the
situation facing the philosopher who wishes to understand
the relation of physical objects to measures of weight and
the situation of the philosopher who wishes to understand
belief (or other attitude), which holds between a person and
a proposition. He says " [t]he analogy suggests that to
define a relation between a person or a physical object and
a proposition is to define a class of properties with a
structure that makes it possible to pick one of the
properties out of the class by specifying a proposition"
([1984], p.ll). An example of the sort of fact Stalnaker
hopes can be explained using the measurement theory model
would be this: that by specifying a proposition to the
effect, say, that John is tall, e.g. with the phrase '(that)
John is tall '
,
I can pick out a belief of Mary (or a wish or
a wondering whether or...).
He discusses three relations that he thinks fit the
model: needing it to be the case that, tending to bring it
about that, and indication. He then proposes that belief is
a species of indication and that a combination of belief and
desire is a species of tending to bring it about that. This
is his strategy for showing how it is possible to give a
naturalistic account of the intentional relations, belief
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and belief-cum-desire
. He thinks he has met the challenge
implicit in Field's claim that the only viable candidate for
giving a naturalistic account involves the postulation of a
language of thought.
A Tarskian truth characterization has no role in any of
this. For Stalnaker, a truth characterization has a very
limited role to play, specifically in relation to external
language. As sketched in Chapter One, Stalnaker endorses a
version of Lewis's idea that the convention in virtue of
which we speak (say) English is a convention of
'truthfulness and trust', and he thinks the way this
convention is perpetuated is by our passing on a small
number of basic conventions embedding basic truth
conditions
.
In some ways, Stalnaker mimics Field as he constructs
his theory, and to some extent, propositions play the role
in Stalnaker 's theory that sentences play in Field's. Both
carry logical structure, but for Stalnaker logical structure
is not sentential structure, it is a boolean structure
defined using sets of worlds. A proposition is a set of
worlds, and one proposition entails another, for example, if
the one set of worlds is a subset of the other. One thing
at issue between Stalnaker and his critics, including Field,
is whether Stalnaker can get away with this minimal amount
of logical structure, or whether he needs the extra
structure that sentences provide.
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As we noted
, two examples are presented to establish
the viability of the general approach. It is convenient to
present Stalnaker' s two examples in two sets of definitions.
The first set is aimed at defining the general type of
relation under which belief
-
cum
-desi re falls, tending-to-
bring-about-that
, which in turn is defined using the notion
of an eqilibrium state.
(Dl) State S is an equilibrium state of system or object x
=df when x is in S, x tends to remain in S.
( D2 ) State S is a disequilibrium state of system or object x
=df when x is in S, x tends to change in ways that bring x
into its equilibrium state.
(D3) x tends-to-bring-about-that P iff P is a logical or
causal consequence of x being in its equilibrium state.
Claim: Belief-cum-desire is a kind of tendency-to-bring-
about
.
(Cf. [1984], p. 12. As Stalnaker gives them the
definitions seem to presuppose that an object has only one
equilibrium state.)
The genus of representation and belief is indication.
Indication can occur when there is an object and a set of
'alternative (possible) states' of the object. Such states,
for Stalnaker, can represent:
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(Dl) Given a state A of an object x, A is an alternative
state of x iff A is intrinsic to x and A tends under normal
or optimal conditions ('fidelity conditions') to correlate
with the environment in some systematic way, and x tends to
be in A because the environment is the way it is.
Principle: If A is an alternative state of an object x, then
there is a 1-1 function f such that necessarily if normal or
optimal conditions obtain, then x is in A iff the
environment of x is in f(A).
(D2) Given an object, x, and a set of alternative states of
x, x indicates that P iff for some A in the relevant set of
alternatives of x, (i) x is in A, and (ii) for some
appropriate f, the proposition that the environment of x is
in state f(A) entails P.
(Cf. p.13 of [Stalnaker, 1984].)
Claim: belief (i.e., belief that) is a kind of indication.
Example: When Mary believes that Poppy is a spy, Mary is in
a belief state that, under optimal conditions, she is only
in if Poppy is a spy, and, under optimal conditions, she is
in that belief state either because Poppy is a spy or
because of something that entails that Poppy is a spy.
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We now turn to the various criticisms that have been offered
of Stalnaker ' s theory.
Is There Hidden Intentionality in Stalnaker's Theory?
A standard strategy to take against a claimed solution
to 'the problem of intentionality' is to try to expose
hidden intentionality in the solution. We saw Stalnaker use
this strategy against Field. One place where there is a
danger of discovering hidden intentionality in Stalnaker's
account is in the notion of optimality. (Stalnaker says
almost nothing about optimality and recognizes that he has
some filling out to do. ) On reading through the definitions
for the first time, one is struck by an apparent need for
optimality to include epistemic optimality. For example,
take a belief that is arrived at through one's vision: if
such a belief is arrived at under optimal conditions, then
it is arrived at when one's eyes are in working order, when
the conditions of perception are right (right for
percept ion 1 ) , and when others of one's mental faculties are
in working order and not being unduly influenced by, say,
wishful thinking. It is hard to imagine how Stalnaker is
going to be able to cover this ground without using
intentional notions. One tack to take would be to appeal to
some notion of best future or best alternative world, where
'best' would be cashed out by some normative notion that is
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not epistemic
. But what normative notion? Something like
maximization of happiness or flourishing obviously will not
do, since false beliefs can contribute to one's well-being,
(and can do so systematically rather than occasionally and
accidentally )
.
What then? Some have looked to evolutionary theory.
Millikan and others have studied the suggestion that, as
Fodor puts it, Darwin might pull Brentano 1 s chestnuts out of
the fire ([Fodor, 1989]). The idea is that our belief-
forming mechanisms are selected to yield beliefs with true
content. A belief or thought of a given type has its
content in virtue of the fact that tokens of that type are
reliably caused by such contents. For example, thoughts to
the effect that such-and-such is a dog are reliably caused
by dogs, on this view. Stalnaker does not discuss this
option, but one can imagine ways of combining it with his
theory: maybe the role of optimality should be played, not
by a normative notion, but simply by a maximization notion
of some kind, which would be spelled out (for belief-in-
general) ultimately in terms of maximization of offspring.
Fodor argues against the evolutionary theory in
[Fodor, 1989]. He says that such a theory of content of
belief cannot solve the 'disjunction problem'. Briefly, the
problem is this. Suppose thought i^s such that dog-thoughts
are about dogs in virtue of a lawlike regularity to the
effect that it's dogs that cause dog-thought tokens. How
then can one be mistaken in thinking that such-and-such is a
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dog? If only dogs cause dog-thoughts, one can't. (-On the
view proposed.) And if some non-dogs cause dog-thoughts
(e.g., cats-on-a-dark-night might cause dog-thoughts), the
thought that such-and-such is a dog would have this as its
content: such-and-such is either a dog or a cat on a dark
night
.
Fodor s claim is that the fine logical grain of content
is too fine to be captured by the coarse grain of causation-
by-things-of-kind-K. Clearly this is right. Fodor uses the
following illustration: suppose we have a frog that snaps at
certain small black items moving in its environment. One
story that can be told about this is that the frog's
snapping mechanism normally resonates to flies and (given
the theory of content we are working with) a certain type of
neural state of the frog, speaking broadly, means 'here's a
fly'. Another story that can be told is that the fly's
snapping mechanism normally resonates to little ambient
black things, which in the frog's environment are almost
always flies, and a certain type of neural state of the frog
means 'here's a little ambient black thing'. As Fodor puts
it, Darwin does not care which story you tell. The point is
that there is no Darwinian fact of the matter about whether
the neural state of the frog resonates to flies or little
ambient black things or about whether it means 'here's a
fly' or 'here's a little ambient black thing'. And there is
no Darwinian fact of the matter about belief. (Cf. Fodor 's
much more sophisticated discussion in [1989].)
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The only conceivable way out I can see for the
proponent of the evolutionary theory of content is to limit
the generality of the proposal severely and say that it is a
theory of actual content. The concepts do£ and cat-on-a-
dark-night in fact are distinguishable, one might say, and
one might challenge Fodor to produce an actual example of a
concept, Py that has the content P—or—Q. Of course he will
not be able to. -But such a theory will presumably not be
of much interest. I take it Stalnaker is not just after a
generalization that covers the history of actual belief and
actual content, but one that tells us something about what
(naturalized) belief and content are. (Although exactly
what he takes the generality of his proposal to be is far
from clear. We will discuss this below.)
So there is a hole in Stalnaker 's theory, and for
someone who is interested in comparing Stalnaker and Field,
it occurs at a crucial spot. We cannot simply say, yes,
Stalnaker has shown us how to wash all the intentionality
out, and Field has not. The two of them must be regarded as
tied at this point.
Stalnaker holds the view that necessarily equivalent
propostions are identical, and since this leads easily to
various unintuitive consequences, critics often seize on it
to generate criticisms. Field tries in such a way to
generate a claim that Stalnaker has extra intentionality in
his theory where Field does not. He focuses on the notion
of deliberation and gives an example where someone
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deliberates about accomplishing two different, but
unbeknowst to him, impossible tasks (trisecting a Euclidean
60 degree angle by straight edge and compass and producing
an example of a plane map that requires more than four
colors to color). The different deliberations could lead to
different behavior, clearly. Field holds that the language-
approach can be used to explain deliberation
without invoking any intentionality
, while Stalnaker will
have to appeal to an intentional notion to explain
deliberation. (See [1986b], pp. 100-101). Deliberation for
Stalnaker involves the weighing of possibilities. This
requires representing the possibilities, says Field, an
intentional notion. Field would prefer to see deliberation
construed as the weighing of states of affairs that are
epistemical ly possible for the agent, which in turn would be
construed as the weighing of state-of-af fair representations
which are treated by the agent as consistent. This latter
notion can be spelled out in terms of the treatment of the
representations in thought.
Field says that Stalnaker cannot handle the case above
without invoking the notion of representing a possibility,
which he takes to be irretrievably intentional for Stalnaker
([1986], p.101). He does not say why he thinks this. Let's
consider ordinary deliberation first, then deliberation
about impossible tasks. It is perhaps not completely clear
how beliefs about what's possible fit into Stalnaker 's
picture of belief, but let's suppose that they do. There is
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no need to posit any extra representation for deliberation
beyond what is embodied in believing things like 'I can go
to the movies or I can go to a concert, the movie is
cheaper, but I really like the Chiffons, although they
aren t as good as they used to be since Ronette
left . .
.
( etc
.
)
. Impossible tasks are seemingly different,
though: presumably trisecting a Euclidean 60 degree angle by
edge and compass and producing an example of a
plane map that requires more than four colors to color are
the same task. Here what Stalnaker should say is that
although 'I wonder if I can trisect ...( etc .)
'
and 'I wonder
if I can produce a plane map. .
.
(etc.
)
are the same question,
'I wonder whether to draw a grid' and 'I wonder whether to
use the compass first or the straightedge' are not: the
parts of the deliberations may be different.
Will Measurement Theory Do What Stalnaker Wants?
Let's examine Stalnaker 's measurement model.
Fundamental to a system of measurement using numbers is a
similarity of structure between properties of physical
objects and properties of numbers. Consider weight, for
example. Physical objects can weigh more and less than
other physical objects. Numbers can be greater and less
than other numbers. If two objects have determinate
weights, then they have a determinate weight when combined.
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Two numbers added together yield another number as their
unique sum. And so on.
There is a simple way to capture the notion of
similarity of structure set-theoretically
. Let a relation
system <A, Rl...Rn> be a set plus one or more relations
defined on that set . A homomorphism from one relation
system, <A, Rl...Rn>, into another, <B, Sl...Sn> is a
mapping, h, that meets the following requirements: (i) for
each element a of A, there is an element b of B such that
h ( a ) — b, and (ii) for each relation R in the first system,
there is a relation S in the second system such that for any
al . .
. an in A, if R relates al...an, then S relates
h ( al ) . . .h ( an ) . Real numbers can measure weight because
there is a homomorphism from the physical objects, plus
certain relations on them, into the real numbers, plus
certain relations on them. For example, the fact that
George's weight is less than Bill's is correlated with 200
being less than 250.
Here I have three points to make. The first is that
assuming the measurement model is explanatory, Stalnaker has
no advantage over Field. Read aright, Field's theory
explains intentionality on the measurement model as much as
Stalnaker 's does. The second is that the measurement model
is not by_ itself very illuminating. Measurement iss closely
analogous to linguistic intentionality and mental
intentionality, but the analogies are so close that
questions about measurement can be raised that parallel
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traditional questions about language and about mental
attitudes. Finally, it is unclear exactly what Stalnaker
takes the two relational systems to be in the case of mental
intent ionality
. Let's look at these points in turn.
Field s exemplar truth definition contains a very
simple syntax and semantics for which there is a
homomorphism from a relational system composed of syntactic
objects plus (grammatical) operations on them into a
relational system composed of individuals and properties
plus certain relations between them. If the fact of a
certain kind of similarity of structure is alone enough to
explain intentionality
,
then Field's theory, at least as far
as his exemplar definition goes, is as explanatory as
Stalnaker 's. (Indeed, Field himself notes the measurement
theory analogy.
)
But how explanatory is Stalnaker' s? Stalnaker uses
the word 'explain' quite a bit without saying what he means
by it. In what sense does measurement theory explain the
relationship between George and 200? Does measurement
theory tell us what it is for George to have his weight
correlated by a system of measurement with the number 200?
This is open to question, and even if it does, one can also
think of other kinds of 'explanation': back in history, the
pound was declared a standard unit by someone with enough
influence that people accepted this as one of their
conventions about measurement, the convention spread,
eventually George was born into a world where the convention
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holds, he grew to a certain size, etc.. One can also
imagine other types of question and explanation: why do we
have pounds, why is a unit of just that size so useful?
(Does it have something to do with our own size, perceptual
abilites, and powers of manipulating objects?) Why is it
evolutionarily advantageous to have such finely structured
measurement systems as we do? Stalnaker wants to balance
the theory of intentionality on the back of measurement
theory, but what kind of theory does he take it to be, and
on what is measurement theory balanced? (Stalnaker is
pointing to the structure of intentionality when he invokes
the measurement model. We did the same thing in an earlier
chapter: we said, as if it were noteworthy, that truth was a
structural notion. It was noteworthy, not as an
'explanation* of truth, but as an attempt to get at the
essential properties of truth.
)
Our second point was that the analogies between
intentionality and measurement are so close that similar
questions arise for measurement as arise for intentionality.
For example, these two questions appear to be parallel: in
what does the determination of an extension for a predicate,
e.g. 'gold', consist? In what does the determination of a
basic unit, e.g., the pound consist? The question whether
one can unilaterally name things 'Charlie' has an analogue
in the question whether one can institute the 'quound'
system all by oneself: a quound is a half of a pound. (If
you weigh 200 pounds, you weigh 400 quounds. —Is this
139
statement true ? ) Questions about compositionality have a
(somewhat fuzzy) analogue in this puzzle: is the weight of
a whole a function of the weights of its parts? But what
about two parts that would explode if put together?
Finally, any disputes about the conventionality of language
win have close analogues in the realm of measurement, which
also involves convention.
Now let s look at the third problem. Stalnaker said,
" [t ]he analogy suggests that to define a relation between a
person or a physical object and a proposition is to define a
class of properties with a structure that makes it possible
to pick one of the properties out of the class by specifying
a proposition" ([1984], p.ll). What are the two relational
systems Stalnaker has in mind? This much is clear: 'George
weighs 200 pounds' is supposed to be analogous to 'George
believes that snow is white'. Intuitively, the number 200
represents George's weight, and the numeral '200'
derivatively (through a separate homomorphism from syntax to
semantics of Mathematicalese ) represents George's weight. I
would agree that the clause 'snow is white' -the syntactic
object- represents, as directly or as derivatively as you
like, one of George's beliefs, but does the proposition
represent either his belief that snow is white or his
believing that snow is white? Or maybe there is a
conglomerate object consisting in the proposition plus
George that does? It is all very unclear. Something seems
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to be backwards: we want the belief-event to represent the
proposition ( al content), not the other way around.
The Problem of Variegated Representation
We saw in the previous chapter that fitting all the
various kinds of mental representation under the umbrella of
Mentalese was a problem for Field. It is not a problem for
Stalnaker, and this constitutes one of the clearest
advantages of his theory over Field's. If Mary believes
that a certain tree is green in virtue of a visual
perception of a certain scene, we can characterize this on
Stalnaker 1 s view simply by saying Mary is in a belief state
that, under optimal conditions, she is only in if the tree
is green, and under optimal conditions, she is in that
belief state either because the tree is green or because of
something that entails it. We do not require that a
specific sentence (presumably isomorphic to 'the tree is
green') be betokened.
We set up as a desideratum that a theory that claims to
be a theory of mental intentionality must show belief to be
continuous with other mental concepts, and not just
propositional ones. We failed to see Field do this. Can
Stalnaker? Things look promising: a vague feeling of
happiness has causes, and ranges of kinds or strengths of
happiness may well correlate with ranges of degrees of some
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property or properties relevant to causing happiness. It
may well work out, on Stalnaker 's theory, that feelings of
happiness indicate the presence of an instantiation of
certain properties. Would the feelings of happiness
represent or perhaps be about the instance of the properties
on Stalnaker's view? There is not enough in the statement
of the theory to answer this question, but there seem to be
no serious threat from this direction. Stalnaker does not
intend all indication to be representation, and he probably
does not intend all representation to be aboutness (in our
narrow sense). There is no reason in principle why the
required distinctions cannot be made.
But there is a flip side to all this. Stalnaker can
perhaps capture a continuous spectrum of mental properties
and relations while Field cannot, but he apparently misses
something Field can capture: the similarities between
certain kinds of mental intentionality and linguistic
intentionality . That Field's theory is a serious contender
as a theory of intentionality is a testament to this
similarity
.
Lewis's theory of linguistic intentionality, which
Stalnaker endorses, is rooted in this definition: an
expression S means a thing x in a language L iff there is a
population of speakers among whom it is a convention to use
S to mean x. (Using S to mean x is a matter of having the
right kind of Gricean intentions. Cf. Lewis [1975].) As we
saw, exactly how Stalnaker is using the measurement model is
142
unclear. But we can perhaps say this: if the Lewis-
Stalnaker view of linguistic intentionality cannot be fitted
to the measurement model, then Stalnaker cannot explain the
similarity of mental and linguistic intentionality. If it
can, then the measurement model covers too much to be very
explanatory on its own . There are homomorphisms everywhere.
Surely the extended homomorphism between a representational
system and what it represents is relevant to explanation,
but surely it is not the whole story.
Belief
Neither Field nor Schiffer thinks Stalnaker gets belief
right. Schiffer 's somewhat testy summary of the account of
belief goes as follows:
There is some optimality condition C which
perhaps never obtains (though it could obtain)
and which is specifiable in wholly non-intentional
and materialistically adequate terms, such that
x believes p iff x is in a belief state that,
under optimal conditions, x is in only if p is
true, and under optimal conditions, x is in that
belief state because p is true, or because some
proposition which entails p is true. ([1986] p.93)
Both Field and Schiffer bring forward the problem of error,
(which we saw Fodor argue cannot be solved by this
approach). Field says, "The obvious problem with making
belief literally a species of indication is that most people
are unreliable about a great many things" ([1986], p.107).
He goes so far as to suggest that this may be the exception
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rather than the rule. Schiffer mentions the problem of
qualitative duplicates: it is possible to have a case where,
even though conditions are optimal, one still is mistaken
because an indistinguishable duplicate has been substituted
for the object one thinks one is having a belief about.
Stalnaker makes three main points in his reply to Field
and Schiffer (See [Stalnaker, 1986].): First, there is a
fair amount of reliability about such homely matters as 'the
lights are on'. Second, normal conditions need not obtain
very often: 'normal' and 'usual' are not the same. Third, a
person always represents vis a vis a range of possibilities.
In the case of qualitative duplicates
-e.g., suppose someone
has substituted a duplicate for Fido sleeping on the rug-
the idea that Fido is a duplicate is not, except in certain
special circumstances, among the relevant possibilities.
These replies do not constitute a very strong defense
(even supposing Fodor ' s impossibility argument could not be
generalized). To take the first point first, sheer quantity
of reliability is irrelevant (this point applies to both
Stalnaker and Field, who should not have made the objection
in the first place). The question is, is it criterial of
beliefs-in-general that they be caused, under optimal
conditions, by the things in the world that make them true ?
(We grant that belief states are alternative possible states
of people.) Unless optimal conditions include ideal
epistemic faculties, the answer would seem to be no. Some
people believe in UFO's, some believe the future can be seen
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in the stars, some believe they lived as Cleopatra in a
previous life, some believe that Elvis is alive and hidden
away somewhere. These beliefs might be true, (i.e., it is
epistemically possible for us that there is a future in
which they turn out to have been true), but it seems plain
that even if they are, they are not (at least in most cases)
caused in the way suggested: rather, these beliefs seem to
originate in various kinds of desires. If on the other
hand, optimal conditions do include ideal epistemic
faculties, Stalnaker seems to be drifting pretty far from a
naturalistic account of belief.
Now let's look at Stalnaker 's second point. He says
that normal conditions need not obtain very often and that
normal 1 and 'usual* are not the same. Let's distinguish
epistemic and objective normality. Certainly, a
perceptually indistinguishable duplicate dog would not be
epistemically normal. But Stalnaker presumably does not
want to be using an intentional notion like epistemic
normalcy. Who is to say that a duplicate dog being slipped
in is not objectively normal, even if it only happens once?
(One wonders whether there is a non-epistemic conception of
normalcy connected with our intuitive everyday uses of the
word 'normal'. E.g., when weather-forecasters talk about
temperatures being normal, they clearly are excluding
consideration of such long periods of time as include the
Ice Age
.
)
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Stalnaker s third point was that one selects one's
beliefs from an antecedently or concurrently given range of
possibilities. That the dog on one's rug is a duplicate
insinuated into one's household is not generally among the
range of possible options. First, this is among the options
available to rational adults aware of cases of trickery and
illusion, even though the probability we assign to it may be
very low. Second, this does not answer the problem of
error. Error arises not only when one selects from a
truncated range of possibilities, but when one selects from
a full range as well.
A second objection comes from Pendlebury ([1986]), who
says
...I consider the notion of indication far too
crude to pin down the contents of belief in general.
The contents of perceptual beliefs (and perhaps some
others that are closely related to them) may be
propositions which the states in question indicate.
But this is surely not true of all beliefs, and
especially not general beliefs which are only
very indirectly connected with experience, for
such beliefs are typically not caused by states of
affairs which they represent. ([1986, p.231])
I guess an example of the sort of general proposition
Pendlebury has in mind would be this: 'ions have an
electrical charge'. He also mentions disjunctions, which he
thinks have no causal powers. With respect to disjunctions,
one can perhaps say that disjunctive beliefs always arise
from external plus internal causes (maybe facts plus
internal disjoining). Pendlebury seems to think that
Stalnaker 's view somehow rules out internal mental
causation, but there is no reason why one's 'environment'
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cannot include previous states of one's own mind. (Granted,
Stalnaker ought to say more about environment: this is
another gap in the theory. Also, beliefs cannot represent
al_l their causes, and since causes thus have to be selected
anyway, one can imagine various refinements of the theory
based on selection of causes.)
With respect to general propositions, it is a little
unclear what Pendlebury's criticism amounts to. Like Field,
Stalnaker focuses on deductive relationships among beliefs
rather than inductive ones, and certainly one can ask about
inductive relationships, but there is no reason to think
there is no answer. It is not at all clear how one is
caused to generalize empirically, but, Pendlebury would
surely agree, causality is involved. We might say something
like this: an empirical belief is caused, under optimal
conditions, either by what makes the belief true or by the
apprehension of states of affairs from which the belief in
question is a good inductive consequence (plus whatever it
is that motivates us to draw inductive conclusions). Again,
if internal causation were ruled out in principle by
Stalnaker' s theory, this would be a problem, but it isn't.
I don't see that Pendlebury has a clear objection here.
(Pendlebury seems to be worried about the fact that a
future-directed belief may not represent the future as it
actually turns out to be. Well, the problem of induction is
always a problem, but it is rather unfair to ask Stalnaker
to solve both it and the problem of intentionality .
)
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A third objection is raised by both Field and
Pendlebury. They think Stalnaker does not have enough
structure in his account of consequence and other logical
relations to account for reasoning. Field suggests that
reasoning essentially involves rules of reasoning and that
when Stalnaker gets around to accounting for reasoning by
rules, he will have to go beyond the boolean structure he
posits. I see no reason why one must use rules in one's
reasoning, and I see no reason why when one does, they
require more than the boolean structure to explain, as long
as they are syntactic rules (Field does not say). If they
are not syntactic rules, Field should first explain his
conception of rule, and then we will see if there is an
objection to Stalnaker.
Belief Attribution
We saw that Field had some problems because his account
of belief did not accord with certain intuitions about
belief attribution. The two problems we looked at were the
problem of equivalent sentences and the problem of the point
of view of the attributer. Stalnaker has an elaborate
theory of belief attribution, and we will see whether he
does better than Field.
According to Stalnaker, 'believes' expresses a relation
between a person and a proposition, a proposition being a
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set of worlds (or a set of circumstances on some versions of
his theory; we'll use worlds). The myriad problems that
arise in explaining belief attribution "arise from the
context-dependence of belief attribution; their solution
belongs to a pragmatics of belief" ([1985], p.l). The most
important ingredient of Stalnaker's view is his notion of
context set. He pictures a discourse or conversation as
taking place relative to a context set, which contains all
the propositions recognized to be 'live options' by the
participants in the conversation at a given time. We say
that propositions true in all the worlds are presupposed by
the participants. If a proposition is true in some, but not
all, of the worlds in the context set, then it may be
asserted. When an assertion is made, the content of what is
asserted is added to the context set in the following sense:
all the propositions incompatible with what is asserted are
kicked out. It is important to note that the above is
supposed to be a theory of conventional presupposition, not
of what the participants actually mentally presuppose: the
participants may be being deceptive and not actually believe
the things their words conventionally presuppose.
In [1985], Stalnaker introduces the notion of a derived
context, used for attitude attribution. "What Phoebe
believes, or is assumed to believe, may be different from,
or incompatible with, what a speaker talking about Phoebe's
beliefs believes or assumes" ([1985], pp. 11-12). So we
postulate a derived context set, determined as follows: "for
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each possible situation in the basic context, Phoebe will be
m a definite belief state which is itself defined by a set
of possible situations - the ones compatible with what
Phoebe believes in that possible situation. The union of
all the possible belief states will [be] the set of all
possible situations that might, for all the speaker
presupposes, be compatible with Phoebe's beliefs" ([1985],
p. 12) .
The two problems we raised for Field were the problem
of equivalent sentences and the problem of the point of view
of the attributer . There are analogues of these problems
for Stalnaker . Instead of the problem of equivalent
sentences, Stalnaker has the problem of necessarily
equivalent sentences. Stalnaker is well known for biting
the bullet with respect to this problem. He has said
various things to try to make the view more palatable. I am
not going to enter into this. The bullet is still a bullet,
and it still has teeth-marks on it. Stalnaker is clearly
denying a basic intuition (not that that is a terrible thing
to do). I merely mention the problem here for the purposes
of comparison with Field, and the two of them are on a par
in that each must face a version of this problem.
The second problem was the problem of the point of view
of the attributer. We saw the following sentence was
problematic for Field: Mary believes that her ugly old
flatware is going to win a prize at the Antiques Show.
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There is a related problem for Stalnaker. Let me give
an overly vivid example to illustrate it, then a more
ordinary one. Suppose I believe that all pieces of fruit
are aliens from outer space and that the fruit on earth
comprises all the aliens on earth. I have tried repeatedly
to warn others about this insidious infiltration, but no one
believes me, and I am aware of this (the foolsl). However,
I always make a point of calling fruit ’aliens'. On the
basis of George having told me there is fruit in the fridge,
report to you, who know all about my little peculiarity,
'George believes some aliens are in the fridge'. (Note that
I may not myself believe George and so may not be willing to
the de r
e
claim 'There are some aliens George
believes to be in the fridge '
.
)
Now, according to
Stalnaker, the derived acceptance set contains the worlds
consistent with what I suppose George to believe. But in
none of those worlds are there aliens in the fridge 1
A more ordinary example would be this. Consider
Thelma, who believes stubbornly and falsely that the trees
on Main St. are beeches. Suppose we know that they are
elms. Suppose she says to you "I saw some people from the
Public Works Department out on Main St. today, and I think
they are going to take down some beeches". You may well
report to me, 'Thelma thinks the Public Works Department is
going to take down some elms on Main St . '
.
This example is
problematic in a way similar to the previous one.
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Here is a possible reply for Stalnaker. Stalnaker
originally set out to explicate something we might call
conventional presupposition, as opposed to speaker
presupposition. His context sets track, not what the
participants in a conversation actually presuppose, but what
they speak as if they presupposed, given our linguistic
conventions. Thus when an adult says to a child 'What did
Santa bring you for Christmas?' he speaks as if he
presupposes Santa exists. Conventional presupposition is
(apparently) tied somehow to semantic meaning, while speaker
presupposition is not. Stalnaker might want to extend this
distinction to the derived context set as well. He might
say that the conventional derived presuppositions of 'George
believes some aliens are in the fridge' include one to the
effect that, as the speaker seemingly supposes, George
believes in aliens, although the speaker may not in fact
suppose this. But consider our second example ('Thelma
thinks that the Public Works Department is going to take
down some elms on Main St.'). The situation described is
common enough that it just isn't one of the normal
conventional (derived) presuppositions of the sentence that
Thelma thinks there are elms on Main St. At best this may
be a conventional presupposition in certain situations: when
the focus of the conversation is Thelma's beliefs, for
example. In other situations, it is not; for example, when
the focus is on the tree-destroying predilections of the
152
Public Works Department. (I believe that the same remarks
apply to the first example.)
The two families of problems about belief attribution
equivalence and point of view, can each produce a problem
for Stalnaker and for Field.
Conclusions
We have seen that Field does not fare very well when
held up against our list of desiderata from Chapter One.
Does Stalnaker fare any better?
Does Stalnaker get rid of the intentionality? He needs
to fill out his concept of optimality before we can be sure,
and above we saw reason to be doubtful. Does he get the
mentalism out? The same remarks apply. Stalnaker 's theory
is organized in a much more sophisticated way than Field's:
He does not take belief as the basic mental attitude, and he
does produce the outlines, at least, of a theory of more
basic mental representation. Is there hope of making belief
continuous with other mental concepts? There's more hope on
Stalnaker' s theory than Field's: all mentalistic concepts do
seem to involve a range of different possible states of an
organism that are evoked by one's environment, even feeling
happy
,
but the price to pay may be attenuation of the
measurement model or failure to explain linguistic
intentionality (or, I guess, to give up the Lewis approach).
Is Stalnaker 's treatment of belief consonant with what is
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known about belief attribution? Field and Stalnaker have
similar problems here. Is the claim of a physicalistic
basis made plausible in some way and not merely asserted?
Stalnaker just takes over Field's project without trying to
argue for it. Neither Stalnaker nor Field gives us decisive
answers to the controversial questions. Something in
particular that both of them pretty much ignore is the
question whether representation must be representation for
someone, and whether, if so, this can be spelled out
naturalist ically.
Stalnaker 's theory is far more sophisticated than
Field's, which has the air of a first shot, but it does not
do a significantly better job of naturalizing
intentionality . Neither makes a convincing case using the
example of belief that he has solved 'the problem of
intentionality'. One problem I have tripped over again and
again is that neither author makes clear what he thinks the
problem of intentionality is. Most of us already believe
that mental and linguistic processes are accompanied in a
regular way by physical processes. So a mere material
biconditional with 'X believes that p' or 'S means that p'
on one side and something describing physicalistic states on
the other is not of all that much interest. Neither
Stalnaker nor Field is offering anything as interesting as,
say, an analysis of belief. The words 'reduction' and
' supervenience ' sometimes appear in discussion, but no
attempt is made to show that a reduction can actually be
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effected or a supervenience relation defined. No claim of
lawlikeness is made (-appropriately, since the relevant
empirical investigations have not been made). Field and
Stalnaker use 'account' and 'explanation', but neither says
what he means by these expressions. Neither Field nor
Stalnaker puts forward a conception of what he is doing that
would rule out, say, using the seemingly silly strategy I
invoked above in defense against Fodor or the related
strategy invoked in an earlier chapter of taking seriously
the orientation to the actual world of a counterfactual that
appears in (our revised version of) Field's definition. So
on these grounds alone, it is very hard to say that either
has solved the problem of intentionality
.
Will truth-characteriztions have any role to play in
explaining intentionality naturalistically
,
whatever that
project turns out to be? Truth for denotational languages
and maybe even for other kinds is an intentional notion, so
the concept of truth as such ought not have a role in
explaining basic intentionality. As we noted earlier,
something common to truth and measurement and linguistic
intentionality and mental intentionality, namely an extended
parallelism of structure, is surely going to be relevant,
but until someone says what explaining intentionality
naturalistically is, we will not know how it is relevant or
what else is relevant.
155
BIBLIOGRAPY
Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1983) Situations and Attitudes.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Block
,
N
. ed. (1981) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology
Vol . II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
.
Blok, W.J. and Pigozzi, D. (1988) 'Alfred Tarski's work on
General Mathematics', Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, 1, 36-
50
.
Burge, T. (1972) 'Introductory Notes on the Theory of
Truth', lecture notes, UCLA, c.1972.
Chisholm, R. (1957) Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.
Ithaca: Cornell .University Press.
Chisholm, R. (1967) ' Intentionality
' in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy . New York: Macmillan, 201-204.
Davidson, D. and Harman, G. (1972) Semantics of Natural
Language Dordrecht: Reidel.
Davidson, D. (1975) 'Thought and Talk' in S. Guttenplan, ed.
Mind and Language . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 7-23.
Davidson, D. (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation .
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dennett, D. (1975) 'Brain Writing and Mind Reading' in K.
Gunderson, ed. Language
,
Mind and Knowledge . Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Dennett, D. (1978) Brainstorms . Cambridge: Bradford Books.
Devitt, Michael (1981) Designation . New York: Columbia
University Press.
Devitt, Michael (1984) Realism and Truth . Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Dummett, M.A.E. (1975) 'What is a Theory of Meaning ?' ( Pt
.
I) in S. Guttenplan, ed. Mind and Language . Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 97-138.
Dummett, M.A.E. (1976) 'What is a Theory of Meaning ? II' in
G. Evans and J. McDowell, eds . Truth and Meaning . Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 67-137.
156
Dummett
,
edition
.
M
^
A \E * .
1
1981
2 Freg e : Philosophy of Languaqe,Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2nd
Etchemendy, J. (1988)
-Tarski on Truth and LogicalConsequence', Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, 1, 51 -79 .
Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John, eds
.
(1976) Truth andMeaning . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Field, Hartry (1972) 'Tarski's Theory of Truth',
Philosophy
, 69, 347-375.
Journal of
Field, Hartry (1978) 'Mental Representation' in N. Block,
ed. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Vol.II. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 78-112.
Field, Hartry (1981) 'Postscript to "Mental Representation"
in N. Block, ed . Readings in Philosophy of Psychology
Vol.II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press”] 112-114
.
Field, H. (1986a) 'The Deflationary Concept of Truth' in G.
Macdonald and C. Wright, Fact, Science & Morality. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Field, H. (1986b) 'Stalnaker on Intentionality
' ,
Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly
, 67, 98-112.
Fodor, J. (1989) 'On There Not Being An Evolutionary Theory
of Content', delivered at N.C. State University, Raleigh,
N.C., October 3, 1989.
Givant, S. (1986) 'Bibliography of Alfred Tarski', Journal
of Symbolic Logic 51, 4, 913-941.
Grice, H. (1957) 'Meaning', Philosophical Review 66, 377-88.
Gunderson, K. ed. (1975) Language
,
Mind and Knowledge .
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
Guttenplan, S., ed. (1975) Mind and Language . Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Harman, G. (197 5) 'Language, Thought and Comminication ' in
K. Gunderson, ed. Language , Mind and Knowledge .
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
Kaplan, D. (1989) 'Afterthoughts' in J. Almog et al., eds.
Themes From Kaplan . New York: Oxford University Press.
Kasher, A. ed. (1976) Language in Focus . Dordrecht: Reidel.
Katz, J. ed. (1985) The Philosophy of Linguistics . New
York: Oxford University Press.
157
Krantz, D.
,
Luce, R.
, Suppes
,
P., and Tversky, A. (1971)
Foundations of Measurement Vol I. New York: Academic Press.
Kripke, S. (1972) Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Kripke, S. (1976) 'Is There a Problem about SubstitutionalQuantification? in G • Evans and J . McDowell
,
eds
• , Truth &
Meaning . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lewis, D. (1975) ’Languages and Language' in D. Lewis,
Phi losophical Papers Vol. I. New York: Oxford University
Press
.
Lewis, D. (1983) Philosophical Papers Vol. I. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Loar, B. (1976) 'Two Theories of Meaning' in G. Evans and J.
McDowell, eds. Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
138-161.
Macdonald, G. and Wright, C. (1986) Fact, Science &
Morality . Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —
Mackay, Alfred F. and Merrill, Daniel D., eds. (1976) Issues
in the Philosophy of Language . New Haven: Yale University
Press
.
McDowell, J. (1980) 'Physicalism and Primitive Denotation:
Field on Tarski' in M. Platts ed . Reference
,
Truth and
Reality . Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 141-166.
Mendelson, E. (1979) Introduction to Mathematical Logic .
New York: Van Nostrand.
Millikan, R. (1989) 'Biosemantics', Journal of Philosophy ,
LXXXVI
, 6, 281-297.
Pendlebury, M. (1987) ' Stalnaker on Inquiry', Journal of
Philosophical Logic , 16, 229-272.
Perry, J. (1979) 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical '
,
Nous 1 3 , 3-21
.
Platts, M. ed. (1980) Reference , Truth and Reality . Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. (1974) 'Some Philosophical Comments on Tarski's
Theory of Truth', Proceedings of Symposia in Pure
Mathematics
,
XXV, 397-409
.
Putnam, H. (1979) Meaning and the Moral Sciences . Boston:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
158
Putnam, H.
Else
' , New
(1985) 'A Comparison of
Literary History XVII, 1
Something with Something
,
61-79.
Schiffer, S. (1986) 'Stalnaker's
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,
Problem of Intentionality
'
67, 87-97.
Soames, S. (1984)
Philosophy
, LXXXI
'What Is a Theory of Truth?’, Journal of411-429.
Soames, S. (1985) Semantics and Psychology'
ed., The Philosophy of Linguistics. New York
University Press.
in J
. Katz
,
, Oxford
Soames, S. (1987) 'Direct Reference, Propositional
Attitudes, and Semantic Content', Philosophical Topics 15,
Stalnaker
,
R. (1972) 'Pragmatics' in D. Davidson and G.
Harman, eds. Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht*
Reidel
,
380-397.
Stalnaker, R. (1976a) 'Propositions', in A. MacKay and D.
Merrill, eds. Issues in the Philosophy of Language. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1976b) 'Possible Worlds', Nous
, 10, 65-75.
Stalnaker, R. (1978) 'Assertion', Syntax and Semantics, 9,
315-332.
Stalnaker, R. (1984) Inquiry . Cambridge: MIT Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1985) 'Belief Attribution and Context'
delivered at the Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, April 12-
14, 1985.
Stalnaker, R. (1986) 'Replies to Schiffer and Field',
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67, 113-123.
Suppes, P. 'Philosophical Implications of Tarski’s Work',
Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, 1, 80-91.
Tarski, A. (1944) 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the
Foundations of Semantics', Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 4, 341-375.
Tarski, A. (1956) Logic , Semantics , Metamathematics .
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tarski, A. (1965) Introduction to Logic . New York: Oxford
University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1961) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus .
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

